IP and copyright law is the most likely legal right to be disputed in court which results in massive social costs

Bell, Abraham-- Professor, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law; Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; and Gideon Parchomovsky-- Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Professor, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law. 2014. “Reinventing Copyright and Patent.” Michigan Law Review 113 (2): 231–78. https://search-ebscohost-com.gonzaga.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=lgs&AN=99133160&site=ehost-live.

As a result of the combined impact of an impressive array of remedial options, vagueness of rights, and high search costs for users, patent and copyright holders often find it more profitable to generate revenue through litigation than by commercializing their inventions and expressive works. This explains, in part, the emergence of so-called patent and copyright trolls—or, in less colorful terms, “non-practicing entities”—that amass portfolios of intellectual property rights without ever intending to turn them into fully developed products subject to market transactions. The sheer volume of intellectual property remedies, the vague content and scope of the rights, and the attendant high search costs make conflicts over intellectual property rights more likely to occur than disputes over other legal rights. The upshot is that holders of intellectual property rights rely on the court system at a disproportionate rate. It is important to emphasize that part of the cost falls on the rest of society. The private cost of litigation does not equal the social cost.66 The public purse partially subsidizes the operation of the legal system. This social subsidy gives private litigants an incentive to utilize the legal system. Thus, inefficient enforcement is costly to society both directly and indirectly. Uniform rules contribute significantly to the inefficiency of intellectual property enforcement.