Water shortages go global AND nuclear
Bronwyn Wake 21, Chief Editor, Nature Climate Change at Springer Nature, “Water Wars,” Nature Climate Change, vol. 11, no. 2, 2, Nature Publishing Group, 02/2021, pp. 84–84
Anthropogenic-driven changes to the hydroclimate will impact on water resources. For example, rainfall changes will affect crop yields and food production; snow and ice, which melt to feed major river systems, are at risk with warming. More than one-sixth of the global population rely on melt-fed river catchments, and this resource is at risk as climate change is likely to cause greater seasonal variability — higher winter flows, because of earlier melt, and reduced summer and autumn flows. Additionally, higher temperatures, and resultant increased biological activity, could lead to decreased water quality. All these changes could occur alongside increased populations and economic development, creating greater demand for a diminishing resource.
The potential for water resource scarcity to lead to conflict, particularly between nations, is the question Michael T. Klare of Hampshire College, Amherst, USA, considers by examining the available research. While within-country water conflicts have been considered and identified as climate change risk, international conflict has received less attention. Globally, many nations share river catchments, and these may not be covered by an agreed cooperative management framework. Conflict between nations over water could trigger secondary engagement from additional nations in an attempt to resolve the conflict.
Klare focuses on South Asia — where major river systems flow through a number of countries — as a significant risk. The region is highly populated, and the populations rely on the transboundary river systems for freshwater resources. Melt from the Himalayan glaciers feeds many of Asia’s major rivers, including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra and Mekong rivers, in the dry season.
From any transboundary river system, high extraction by an upstream nation can result in reduced availability to downstream nations, with the potential for conflict over water rights. Pakistan is one example that Klare considers. It is a nation reliant on agriculture, fed by water from the Indus River, which is also used for electricity generation. The Indus originates in China with additional feeds from India, placing Pakistan as a downstream nation, with tensions previously arising over water rights.
If river flows reduce with climate change, and upstream extractions remain the same or upstream nations divert additional flow for their own benefit, there is the potential for conflict between Pakistan and India, as well as conflict within Pakistan. Syria is an example of where climate and water have contributed to domestic conflict (Weather Clim. Soc. 6, 331–340; 2014).
India and Pakistan have a history of dispute over the Kashmir region, and there have been threats to dam the tributaries of the Indus, which India has control over, in the past during tense periods. Both nations have nuclear capacity, and Klare outlines how any sign that nuclear weapons could fall into hostile parties’ possession (as a result of domestic conflict or coup) would invoke a response from the USA to prevent this outcome.