Democracy resilient

Available measures suggest the proportion of democratic countries in the world today is at or near an all-time high. The few indicators that show some backsliding indicate only a return to the level of the 1990s, a time when liberal democracy was widely considered triumphant. The rate of increase has slowed. But this follows the stunning surge of democracy’s “third wave.” The rate of failures among existing democracies is close to that predicted by their levels of economic development, income growth, and past democratic experience. Moreover, whereas previous waves have been followed within 10-15 years by a significant fall in the proportion of democracies, that has not occurred this time, at least so far. Neither the rate of democratic breakdowns nor that of quality deteriorations in existing democracies is historically high. Previous literature and the survival models presented here confirm that high economic development, positive economic growth, and extensive democratic experience are associated with much lower odds of democratic breakdown. Based on such estimated relationships, the hazard of a breakdown in the US today appears extremely low. While some data suggest a weakening of commitment to democracy among parts of the US public—which is worrying in itself—it is hard to find any systematic evidence that low or falling public support for democracy causes democratic breakdowns. As for elite norms, Latin American countries where a radicalized military supported dictatorship have sometimes succumbed to antidemocratic coups. But excluding such extreme cases, the claim that eroding norms cause democracies to fail appears to rest on anecdotal evidence. Even if it does not constitute a general trend, deterioration in the quality of democracy in countries such as Hungary and Poland is obviously cause for concern, as is the reversion to authoritarianism in Russia and Turkey. It is certainly possible that a global slide in democracy has begun that will accelerate in coming years. It is also possible that US institutions will prove weaker than expected. Few democracies have been tested by the kind of demographic change forecast for coming decades, as the previously dominant race loses its majority status. Still it is important to distinguish between fears for the future and expectations that are reasonable based on available evidence. The historical record suggests that democracies like the US have inner resources that distinguish them from younger and poorer ones. They are far less vulnerable to destructive demagogues than much current commentary implies