Democracies are comparatively more peaceful than alternatives.

Autocrats start risky wars Three historically consistent patterns have emerged in the war in Ukraine. First, autocracies are more likely than democracies to start risky wars they go on to lose. Dictators are more willing to initiate high-risk wars because they know they can crack down on political opposition and remain in power if the fight goes badly. Iraq, for instance, launched two disastrous invasions of Iran and Kuwait. Even so, Saddam Hussein crushed internal uprisings to stay in power. Democratic leaders often, but not always, avoid these kinds of military failures, fearing the domestic electoral backlash of wars gone wrong. This is why democracies tend to win their wars — and why they wage shorter wars with fewer casualties. Like past authoritarians in Russia and elsewhere, Russian President Vladimir Putin has positioned himself domestically. He has steadily consolidated his hold on power over two decades, neutering the Russian parliament and political opponents, and destroying Russia’s independent media. Putin is now using that unchecked power to crush minor outbreaks of opposition, even from 7-year-old children. By eradicating the last vestiges of free speech and press in Russia, Putin may have felt comfortable taking on the risk of invading Ukraine. Dictators have to keep their militaries in check Second, like most dictators, Putin probably has some concerns about being overthrown by his own military. Dictators guard against this potential threat by centralizing military command authority and reducing the ability of lower-level commanders to take the initiative in battle. These moves may reduce an army’s ability to seize power in a crisis — but also undercut the military’s ability to defeat foreign foes. In its wars against Israel, the Egyptian leadership consistently restrained military leaders to lower the risk of an internal coup — but this crippled Egyptian fighting ability. Conversely, Israel’s willingness to grant command authority to lower-level officers has proven highly effective. Putin’s army today demonstrates the calcification and rigidity of a dictatorship. He appears unwilling to delegate decision-making autonomy to lower-level commanders, reducing military effectiveness. One result is that many high-level Russian officers lead from the front lines, where they have been killed in large numbers. Russia’s lower-ranked officers are not prepared or formally authorized to fill that leadership void. The Russian military’s inflexibility may explain other areas of poor performance. These include Russia’s curious vulnerability to Ukraine’s slow but lethal tank-killing drones, and the decision to drive a 40-mile-long Russian tank column into Ukraine along main roads exposed to ambush. Ukrainian troops, in contrast, are demonstrating bravery under fire combined with individual initiative — and inflicting surprising damage on Russian forces and supply lines. Dictators tend to ignore the truth Third, dictators often surround themselves with yes-men and political cronies, who deceive or remain silent rather than tell the unvarnished truth. Those in the inner circle typically reassure the leader that their vaunted troops will sweep aside the weak and corrupt enemy. In 1939, for instance, Joseph Stalin found out the hard way that invading Finland in winter was asking for trouble. In contrast, democratic leaders are more likely to have the benefit of robust debate inside and outside government. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush heard the hard truth from General Colin Powell that victory over Iraq would require a massive effort. Powell got the military commitment he said was necessary and delivered the most lopsided military victory in modern history. What about Putin? Every indication is that the Russian president is isolated and getting poor information. His arch-loyal defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, tasked with modernizing the Russian military over the last decade, promised Putin rapid victory — then apparently disappeared from view for nearly two weeks. Putin’s generals and intelligence chief reportedly refused to tell him the truth before the war: that years of Russian military reform had not made substantial progress, instead producing a “Potemkin military.” Actual combat is an unfailing truth-teller. Russian forces have suffered remarkable casualties and appear unable to execute basic battle requirements, such as implementing vehicle maintenance and providing troops with food and warm clothing.