They are IP rightholders’ enforcement option
Baker* and Geddes** 15, *Professor Baker teaches at Northeastern University School of Law and is an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of KwaZulu Natal, S.A. ** Master of Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, focusing on global health policy. She has a Master of Laws from Cambridge University, specializing in international intellectual property law, and previously worked as a litigation associate at King & Wood Mallesons. (Brook K* and Katrina**, Fall 2015, “ARTICLE: CORPORATE POWER UNBOUND: INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION OF IP MONOPOLIES ON MEDICINES--ELI LILLY V. CANADA AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT”, 23 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2, 55. Lexis accessed online via KU libraries)
The practical implications of this radical assertion of investor privilege is two-fold. First, foreign IP investors, mainly from rich countries, could now directly sue virtually any government, rich or poor, to enforce any and all directly or indirectly incorporated IP-related treaties or the highest standard of comparable national IP law found anywhere in the world. These investor prerogatives sit on top of state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms under TRIPS and other trade agreements. They sit on top of more stringent border and criminal enforcement measures that consume state resources. They sit on top of state-state investment clause dispute resolution. Finally they sit on top of new deterrent civil remedies, mandatory injunction rights and draconian damages. In other words, IP rightholders' enforcement options are now unbound.