It’s revenue neutral.
Hollis 05, Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary. (Aidan, 1-17-2005, “An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation,” https://keionline.org/misc-docs/drugprizes.pdf)
The savings to governments from lower pharmaceutical prices would be substantial and could allow even a very large PIF to be approximately revenue neutral. Currently, US federal, state, and city government spending on pharmaceuticals is approximately $80bn28, of which around $10bn is spent on drugs available generically. Under the proposed plan, assuming modest expansion of the quantities of drugs financed, and a 65% decrease in average price for branded products, government spending on pharmaceuticals would fall to approximately $35bn annually, for a savings of $45bn. Suppose that the US financed its own national PIF of $60bn (with other national governments funding their own PIFs for another $60bn, approximately in line with current global pharmaceutical revenues). Then US governments would require only a small increase in revenues under the proposed system. Consumers would benefit from substantial savings. In other countries, where the government share of pharmaceutical spending is higher, savings could likely be realized even with very substantial contributions to the PIF.29