Independently, bad-actor engineering is inevitable. Research is key to stay one-step-ahead of genetically engineered pathogens.

In the past two centuries, we went from discovering the world of microbes invisible to the human eye to growing them in petri dishes, sequencing their genomes and now, altering their DNA. Just in the past 10 years, we have seen major breakthroughs in our biotechnological capabilities, such as the use of gene drives, the genetic cut-and-paste tool CRISPR-Cas9, and the world’s first genetically modified babies. A gene drive is a genetic mechanism by which a desired genetic sequence can be spread through a population faster than traditional inheritance. This strategy can be so effective that traits can spread even if they result in a disadvantageous trait, such as sterility. Thus, gene drives present potential new solutions for a variety of issues facing humanity, including eradicating, or altering disease carriers such as mosquitoes and controlling invasive species of plants, insects, or toads. What is worrisome, however, is that these biotechnological breakthroughs are not only in the hands of state actors and institutions. The rapid democratisation of biotech has made these powerful tools increasingly available to groups from the undergraduate biologist to the DIY biohacking communities. When the first human genome was sequenced in 2001, it took almost 15 years and the cost was around $2,6 billion. Today, a genome can be sequenced in an hour for a price of less than $1.000. While our growing biotechnological knowledge has benefits, it is a double-edged sword and can be misused — intentionally or unintentionally — in ways that can cause great harm. As the number of people with access to the technology grows, so does the risk for the technologies to be misapplied with deadly and global impact. Error or terror: bad bugs or bad guys? A biotechnological catastrophe may be caused by an engineered organism being accidentally released from controlled research environments, by the planned release of such an organism which then turns out to have unforeseen and catastrophic interactions with ecosystems, or by intentional usage of biological agents in biological warfare or bioterrorism attacks. The existential risks posed by most scientific and medical research is negligible. However, there is ongoing research into live agents of smallpox, SARS, H5N1, and avian flu, which, if escaped mistakenly, could wreak havoc. It is likely possible to engineer pathogens that are even more dangerous than the natural strains by increasing their incubation time, transmissibility, lethality, or resistance to vaccination and treatment. Research by well-intentioned actors into potential pathogens of pandemic, both natural — and down the road synthetic — is a path society can pursue to try to stay one step ahead of bad actors by exploring the space of possibilities and prepare adequately. Engineering pathogens to study them of course comes with its own set of dangers, but the benefits to resiliency might outweigh the risks and thus presents a fine line to be walked by the scientific community and its regulators. The technological means to genetically modify pathogenic characteristics are likely to become more widely available in the future. The main candidate for biological existential risk in the coming decades thus stems from our own technology and particularly the risk of misuse by groups or even individuals. Capabilities that were once only in the hands of governments and universities are increasingly moving into the living rooms and garages of individuals. Nick Bostrom from The Oxford Future of Humanity Institute estimates from a survey among researchers a 5% probability of a pandemic of catastrophic proportions (1 billion deaths) from natural sources by 2100 and estimate a 10% probability from an engineered pandemic.