No Bioterror impact, too many implementation hurdles

The heightened sense of vulnerability after the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States attacks has brought bioterrorism to the forefront of public attention (Koblentz, 2009). In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated that, “the threat posed by biological agents employed in a terrorist attack on the United States is arguably the most important homeland security challenge of our era. Even if there are fewer casualties, additional second-order consequences (including psychological, social, and economic effects) would dramatically compound the effects” (Radosavljevic, 2009). The anthrax attacks of 2001, coined the Amerithrax attacks, revealed a deep-seeded vulnerability within the U.S. During those attacks, 20 billion anthrax spores were released from half a teaspoon of powder. Infecting 22 known people and resulting in 5 deaths, this case of bioterrorism cost roughly $6 billion (Thompson, 2006). While it was later reported that an American scientist, Dr. Bruce Ivins, was the main suspect for the Amerithrax attacks, there continues to be fake attacks involving baby powder and other faux anthrax. Moreover, there are indeed terrorist organizations that have sought to use bioweapons. Al Qaeda leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir stated in a 2006 audiotape that he implored scientists and experts to join al Qaeda in the testing and creation of biological weapons (Thompson, 2006). The attention that bioterrorism garners has far reaching consequences that cause economic, psychological, and political disruptions. Yet the reality of these weapons suggests a more lackluster outcome. Attacks like those of the Rajneeshees cult in Oregon, which infected hundreds of people with salmonella, are considered success stories, but cults like Aum Shinrikyo, which had the monetary means to employ these weapons, never experienced that kind of success. Indeed, because it is impossible to completely defend against all attacks, threat assessment is crucial. The disputed degree of U.S. vulnerability has become even more heated among scientists, with some arguing that the U.S. may have over-assessed the threat (Thompons, 2006). Many subject matter experts have pointed to the instantaneous wave of federal support that biodefense received after the Amerithrax attacks, and that while this support was needed, there was little assessment into the realities of the bioterrorist threat. Relatively little effort has been made to determine the threat of terrorist use of bioterrorism; instead, the U.S. has focused on internal vulnerabilities. Dr. Leitenberg points out that “within 4 years, almost $30 billion in federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat. This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis” (Leitenberg, 2005). Vulnerability is an ongoing reality, but one must also consider whether the threat of bioweapons is as great as the U.S. government previously estimated. While there is an undeniable U.S. vulnerability to bioweapons attack, the lack of capabilities to carry out such attacks has perhaps created a hypersensitivity to such threats. Non-state actors have in the past, and will continue in the future, to consider and employ the use of bioweapons. However, through an analysis of past, small-scale attacks in the U.S., the barriers to successful large-scale bioterrorism can be identified. Diffusion-of-innovation studies address why and at what rate new ideas (such as technologies) spread throughout a culture or society. The most popular example Rogers points to is the unsuccessful attempt to improve sanitation and health in Peru during a health two-year health campaign. The project focused on boiling water and the link between sanitation and illness but was largely deemed a failure because campaign workers failed to identify the social norms and beliefs that saw boiled water as diseased. Rogers pointed out that the societal habits and norms within a society will outweigh the innovation regardless of its benefit to them (Rogers, 1983). In effect, this theory discusses the question of why certain ideas become popular while others never take off. With this concept in mind, analyzing why bioweapons have proven their efficacy, yet have not been utilized on a large-scale by non-state actors, reveals substantial barriers to utilization This thesis seeks to point out the substantial hurdles non-state actors face when attempting to use bioweapons. It will do this by addressing several key points in the process of using bioweapons, from procuring the agent to dissemination and even to the impact of environmental conditions. An analysis of specific historical cases of bioterrorism through such a capabilities assessment will demonstrate the prevalent deterrents terrorists face when considering and deploying bioweapons. In the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission’s 2006 Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment, threat assessment is broken down into a diagram as shown in Figure 1 (Ackerman, 2006). The diagram in Figure 1 and equation in Figure 2 address the role of threat, likelihood of attack, motivation, capability, vulnerability of assets, hazard posed, and value. In the past, assessments of bioterrorism have focused on only a small section of these variables, mainly the consequences of attacks, value of assets being defended, and vulnerabilities. This analysis will focus on the capabilities and motivations of potential bioterrorists and assess their impact on actual usage of bioweapons. Bioterrorism Threat Assessment Figure 1. Bioterrorism Threat Assessment (Ackerman, 2006) Figure 1 presents these components, indicating the relationship between the intention and capability of an attacker. The equation demonstrated in Figure 2 also relays the importance of capabilities and motivation in the equation regarding threat of attack. This equation points to the role of intent, vulnerability, and capabilities in regards to the threat of an attack (Thompson, 2006). Previous analyses have focused on the vulnerability component of this equation. The emphasis on capabilities and motivation is the driving force behind this analysis in order to provide a better understanding of terrorist capabilities when pursuing bioterrorism. This thesis will attempt to do this through an analysis of the hurdles that inhibit utilization.