The aff’s essentializing thesis dooms it to irrelevancy and causes deep aporia

Eighth, the analytical relevance of Agamben’s account of power for contemporary politics is doubtful. Agamben’s thesis does not allow us, but forces us, to examine the Roman Republic, Nazi Germany and homeland security (and, literally, everything in between) with the same analytical tools – because, strictly speaking, they are the same thing, differentiated only by the degree in which the true nature of power is revealed in each case (see Scheuerman 2006, 69). Its disengagement from socio-historical specificity deprives it of the capacity to discuss the reasons for, and the processes through which, the state of exception is triggered; bios is reduced to bare life, and the sovereign conducts its power/violence. This results in deep aporia when the exception thesis confronts actuality – including that of homeland security. For instance, while the decision is taken by the sovereign, we do not know who the sovereign is. Even when specified by law, there is no guarantee that the specified entity does indeed determine action. What if the sovereign’s mobilisation in the exception results in a coup by the army against its political overlord? Is that an exception within the exception, or a displacement of the seat of sovereign power, and if so, when does this displacement end and how do we know it has ended? More importantly, is the President of the United States of America “sovereign”? Is the executive branch (or its armed forces) over which he presides a singular, unitary entity or has he to overcome, repress and reconcile internal divisions and antagonisms? Does this affect the capacity and quality of sovereign action in an emergency? What is the range of the sovereign decision? Is everyone equally affected by it? Moreover, is the sovereign a subject with its own will and interests, or does it pertain to interests and antagonisms in the broader society? If the former, then what motivates the sovereign? Is this motivation the same for all sovereigns at all times? If the latter, is it possible that the sovereign acts on behalf of “powerful men” operating in his institutional shadow? Would the character of their interests influence the modalities, intensity, expanse, duration and purpose of the exception – or whether the exception is triggered at all? Would an exception declared by a sovereign “captured” by big petroleum companies be “the same” with that of a sovereign “captured” by school teachers? (And why does the former scenario seem more plausible than the latter?). Furthermore, even if conceivable, is reduction to bare life (the stripping of the individual from legal mediation and political capacity) the moment where sovereign power is constituted or the moment it collapses? (Boukalas 2012a, 292–293). And, finally, why does normality exist at all? Why does the bearer of awesome power use it only occasionally? (see Colatrella 2011). It is not clear as to where this leaves the exception thesis. It seems that, by abstracting his concepts from social and historical content, Agamben does not provide structures that can be populated by any/every specific socio-historical reality. On the contrary, socio-historical content crashes these empty structures: the price for essentialism is irrelevance to any/every existing social reality