Independently, a robust defense industry is key to defeat Russia in Ukraine.

The challenges facing the United States are easier to solve than those facing Russia. The gap that Ukraine and its partners need to close to help Ukraine win is smaller than the gap that Russia needs to close to achieve its objectives in Ukraine. The Kremlin has mobilized a lot of its resources — far from all that the Kremlin can mobilize but orders of magnitude higher than what the West has mobilized on behalf of Ukraine. Russia had every advantage in the last ten years and occupied 18% of Ukraine at an enormous cost. Putin will mobilize more manpower and material, but Russia’s surge capacity is neither unlimited nor without costs and constraints.¶ The West is not as fragile as Russia wants us to think. Putin sought but failed to freeze Europe.[67] He has been trying but has failed to break NATO (though he will have a real chance to do so if Russia wins in Ukraine). Minimizing the West’s perception of its own strength is a core component of the Kremlin’s perception manipulation.¶ The West is awakening. Many Western leaders and societies have awakened to the reality that there is no going back to the status quo ante, that Russia is a self-declared adversary, and that the West has two choices: counter the threat or surrender to it. Ukraine’s European and Asia-Pacific partners began forming coalitions for weapon procurement to support Ukraine; European countries began ramping up their defense industrial bases to restock NATO supplies and assist Ukraine.[68] French President Emanuel Macron warned the West against showing any signs of weakness to Russia as he entertained the prospect of sending Western troops into Ukraine.[69] But US leadership remains indispensable.¶ Western advantage is not a permanent condition. Ukrainian lives and the Western advantage over Russia are the costs of US and Western decision-making delays. Ukraine’s agency and will to fight are assets of historical proportions that should not be taken for granted. Delaying resource mobilization decisions in the West will erode this center of gravity. Putin has considered Russia to be at war with the West for a while and has been acting like it. Putin recently signed decrees restoring the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, which may be in preparation for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[70] The Kremlin intensified the use of rhetorical threats against Finland and the Baltic countries, including accusing Baltic countries of intolerance towards ethnic Russians in the region.[71] The erosion of the West’s capability to counter the Russian threat will be proportionate to the delays in the Western realization of the threat itself.¶ V. The Next Decisions¶ The United States must restore its strategic clarity and get the big idea right: the best course of action for US interests is to support Ukraine to its victory, as the only path to a durable peace rather than a temporary respite, and then help Ukraine rebuild, putting the largest combat-effective friendly military in Europe at the forefront of NATO’s defense.[72]¶ The United States needs to surge and then persist in support of this objective. A sustained US effort, rather than a one-time surge, will grant Ukraine the certainty about resourcing that it can expect from international partners so Ukraine can plan for future operations. The US decision to persist should also stem from a recognition that Russia is a persistent challenge that requires persistent effort. The costs of persistence are minor compared to the catastrophic and irreversible consequences of letting Russia prevail in Ukraine.¶ The United States and other Ukrainian allies need to take several specific and immediate steps:¶ 1. Provide Ukraine with sufficient military aid and other support required for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlefield.[73]¶ 2. Support Ukraine’s effort to expand its defense industrial base (DIB) but also ramp up the US and allied DIB to support Ukraine in the medium term and to strengthen our own deterrence capabilities against Russia and other US adversaries. ¶ 3. Target Russia’s capability to sustain the war against Ukraine.[74]¶ Deny Russia’s sanctuaries. Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. The West must abandon the Russian information line that Russia, having launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, can demand immunity from attack with Western or Ukrainian weapons. The United States must remove any existing constraints on Ukraine to target legitimate Russian military and defense industrial capabilities in Russia. The West should also develop a long-term strategy against “sacred Russian cows” in the West, such as the Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom. Rosatom is a major arm of the Kremlin, doing its bidding from Ukraine to the Arctic to Africa largely unimpeded due the Western economic interdependencies.[75] The long-term divestment from Rosatom is likely feasible, but it requires just that — for us to think in terms of a long-term strategy of denying Russia its capability sanctuaries.¶ Focus on asymmetries. Ukraine has exposed numerous Russian weaknesses from the vulnerabilities of the Black Sea Fleet to the vulnerability of Russian defense industrial assets to Ukrainian drone and missile strikes.[76] The United States should amplify and accelerate not constrain these effective asymmetric warfare approaches that also impact Russia’s battlefield operations and force Putin to make hard choices about resource allocation. ¶ Target Russia’s capability globally. Putin is playing the full board, so should we – targeting Russia’s capability from Africa to the Arctic.¶ Strip the Kremlin of its offset capabilities. The United States must defy the Kremlin’s efforts to alter our own decision making and will. The United States must also deny the Kremlin the luxury of time to regroup on the battlefield, and to rebuild Russia’s broader military and perception manipulation capabilities only later to be used against us.