Strong DIB enhances deterrence of China- prevents an invasion of Taiwan that goes nuclear

senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, director of the International Security Program, and director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); The U.S. Defense Industrial Base Is Not Prepared for a Possible Conflict with China; https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/

A U.S. war with China would be disastrous. Impacts could include large numbers of military and civilian casualties and fatalities, wiping out significant portions of the U.S. and Chinese militaries, expanding to other countries and regions, massive economic disruptions, possible escalation to nuclear war, and creation of large-scale environmental and humanitarian implications. It is critical, then, to deter a Chinese invasion and prevent a war. There are two main types of deterrence in the context of a possible war with China: 1. Deterrence by Denial Preventing an adversary (such as China) from taking an action (such as invading Taiwan) by making the action infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying the adversary confidence in achieving its objectives. 2. Deterrence by Punishment Preventing an adversary (such as China) from taking an action (such as invading Taiwan) by imposing severe costs if the action occurs. In both cases, a strong U.S. industrial base—with sufficient munitions stockpiles and weapons systems—is critical for deterring Chinese action. Effective deterrence is based, in part, on having the necessary capabilities for warfighting. Yet the United States' defense industrial base would have a difficult time sustaining a protracted conflict. So would its major allies and partners in Europe and Asia. With Xi Jinping now in his third term following the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, most likely confident and emboldened, it is unclear what the timelines could be for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. While Xi Jinping appears intent on recovering Taiwan and has tied it to the “mandate from heaven,” there are no guarantees such an invasion will actually occur. For the purposes of U.S. planning and deterrence, it is important to think through what factors China would consider in an invasion, and how heavily those factors would be weighted. These factors include the capabilities and readiness of the People’s Liberation Army, the capabilities and force posture of the United States, the capabilities and force posture of U.S. allies and partners, the progress of Taiwan in reforming its military and the willingness of Taiwan to fight, the degree to which a practical window for peaceful unification is closing, and China’s domestic economic and political conditions. While it is unlikely that China has a concrete timeline for invasion, the United States needs to be ready now. As the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted, it is difficult to predict the timelines for any war.