The alternative is to engage in reflexive Orientalism by radically affirming oriental imagery–only a negative ballot can act as an investment in reflexive orientalist discourse that calls to light the violent framework underlying the Aff’s advocacy

Reflexive Orientalism refers to the acceptance of Orientalism byChinese intellectualsand politicians and the development of new identities with a sense of subjectivity accordingly.As a result, the Orientalized Chinese may assert Orientalist images upon him/herself.Instead of seeing these images negatively, however, reflexive Orientalists establish their own justification for the imagesthat they accept. There is nothing bad about having backward economics, undeveloped civil society, collectivistic human rights, or relatively limited national defense capability.The key here is that reflexive Orientalists are able to jettison the teleology of linear modernity. In substitute, they place China in its historical path without specifying its definite destiny.One is able to explain away the seemingly backward images by stressing national uniqueness, which territorial sovereignty implicitly protects. The counter-state arises when the purpose of the state is no more than a deep-seated emotion to oppose the Orientalist prescription set by Western countries.For reflexive Orientalists, backwardness acquires new meanings that are not familiar to the sovereignty adherents for now backwardness no longer predicates upon a fixed direction.Since modernity had no fixed form for them, the advanced nature of Western countries in establish- ing civil liberty lose their advantage in China’s search for a remedy. China need not look to the West for models of development. This way, backwardness in China as indicated by the paradigm of sovereignty ironically proves the existence of alternative routes of development. Being an alternative further contributes to the sense of uniqueness in China. Reflexive Orientalism thus deprives sovereignty of its original taste for liberal democracy and market capitalism.What remains for reflexivists is the legitimacy to use force to exclude foreign influences that are judged not conducive to the Chinese alternative still under making.In this sense, globalization isneither a progressionist’s gospel, nor an indigenizer’s nightmare, but an opportunity to realize new possibilities.35 To force modernization modeled upon European experiences would be tantamount to distorting personality and culture.Chinese leaders shouldaccordingly pace modernization and democratization to avoid causing anxiety due to the rupture of the historical path.36 Furthermore, neither should a reflexivist trust liberal spontaneity, nor authoritarian leadership. Some combination of cre- ativity and intervention is inevitable. To gain room for trial and error sovereign defense is necessary to keep foreign intervention from tak- ing place. On the other hand, the political system in China should adapt to the new configuration of a state–society relationship brought about by economic changes. The role of the counter-state in foreign policy looms large in reflexive Orientalism.China’s sovereign territory must be well guarded before nationals have room for creative adaptation. However, what counts as foreign intrusion is not always clear under globalization. Negotiation between the locals and the Communist Party center as well as between the center and the foreign countries isequally importantin determining the perception of the Chinese leaders con- cerning foreign intervention. The opposite is true, too. When negoti- ations between China and the foreign countries encounter difficulties, differences between the locals and the center will more easily be interpreted as involving foreign intervention. Foreign policy usually appears to be lacking consistency as the mood varies with situations. A model of this position shifting in chapter 4 expresses the embedded inconsistency of postcolonial as well as reflexivist foreign policy. To begin with, the Orientalist definition of China’s backwardness is omnipotent because reflexivists, with some knowledge of modern- ization linearity, learn to internalize it.Then the dispute over the proper role of the Chinese state naturally arises between reflexivists and foreign Orientalists. Orientalists would consider the protective shield that the Chinese state presents in front of Western influences as a historically outdatedtool of control, believing that the fate of China lies in the transformation of backwardness into Western modernity. Reflexivists can counter that position out of a conviction that Western modernity at best suffocates other indigenous alternatives that may lead to some version of modernity with Chinese characteristics.In other words, reflexive Orientalism prepares interstate confrontation and interstate confrontation in turn consolidates reflexivists’ reliance on the mechanism of the state.On the one hand, reflexivists’ historical experiences produce very different feelings about state in China than in the Western countries. These feelings demand that reflex- ivists must not act in complete accordance to Western expectation. Without developing their own perspectives on the state system or appre- ciating their state being counter-state, however, reflexivists’ most expe- dient solution to the maintenance of uniqueness is to be confrontational.Reflexivists do not have an alternative conceptual framework to signify Chineseness except state sovereignty.This sovereignty-related sensitivity is exacerbated whenever interactions between China and the West escalate as if assimilation into Western modernity would be taking place. Compared with postcolonialists whose histories are composed of hybrid interpretation, reflexivists are clear about their wish to represent an authentic Chinaand therefore are not psychologically prepared to act dependently without hurting their self-dignity.On the other hand, modern knowledge of reflexivists alerts them to the backwardnessof China. This is why they are more tolerant toward new possibilities than indigenizers who feel antagonistic toward anything Western.Ambivalence of this sort can explain incon- sistencies and cycles in reflexivist foreign policy. There is a need to act independently, and there is also a need to act expediently. Sensitivity toward violation of sovereignty varies by mood or by situation. It is quite possible that something conceived of as a violation in one situation is accepted without being questioned in another.37 For a reflexivist, a sense of inferiority is inevitable because the sovereignty paradigm judges one’s ranking partly by looking at the strength of civil society. Reflexivists acknowledge that civil culture is not ripe in China, protection of individual human rights is flawed, and economic growth depends on the technology, market, and manage- ment of the outside world. Nonetheless, reflexivists maintain that civil society may not be the most appropriate form of participation in China.They further argue that collectivism, correctly identified by Western analysts as a feature of Chinese politics, is reality that is not subject to changes over night. In short, Orientalists and reflexivists agree on most observations that come out of Orientalist perspectives. Reflexivists try to overcome the sense of inferiority by stressing equal sovereignty.Progressionists are outcasts in Chinese politics even though they may be heard often and even loudly in the academic fields, both domestic as well as overseas. Postcolonials are rare in China because not many politicians in China have experienced colonial cultural con- quering. It is the battle between indigenizers and reflexivists that shapes the ups and downs in Chinese foreign policy. For reflexivists, the job is primarily defensive while for indigenizers there is a drive for offense, retaliation, or self-assertion. Reflexivists do not often assert specific solutions, at least not necessarily resulting in some sort of indigenous campaign, such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, or the anti-bourgeois liberalization. The more moderate position often incorporates the reflexivists’ initial inferior position. On this moderate position, even China could not possibly remain static and has already witnessed tumultuous changes. Reflexivists believe that changes are irrevocable and the mission of the Chinese counter-state is to make sure that China does not sink once again to the status of colony.Reflexivists do not hesitate to use the state to mobilize economic production as well as anti-imperialist campaigns. Since the motivation is to substantiate the claim of Chinese characteristics vis-à-vis the West, the nature of being a counter-state remains true even in domestic politics. The substitution of counter- state for liberal-styled passive state in China insinuates reflexivists’ lack of confidence in Chinese nationals’ own initiative in finding solutions, hence the distrust toward spontaneity that powerless twenty-first- century progressionists/liberals always worship. In sum, reflexivists accept the Orientalist description, but not the Orientalist prescription. The acceptance is the result of their cognitive incapacity to move beyond the paradigms of modernity and sover- eignty. The refusal of prescription carries with it a kind of amorphous, atavistic resentment against historical imperialism and the suspicion that contemporary imperialism lingers on. Their knowledge about modernization alleviates the absurdity indigenizers may display in anti-Western campaigns. Their access to power leads them away from downgrading their own national identity through anti-Chinese campaigns. Finally, their historical memory of imperialist intrusion reduces sympathy toward hybrid postcolonials. As reflexivists, they are armed with a dubious hope for the future that is periodically relegated to oblivion due to the confrontational approach that the sensitive counter-state is made to adopt every once in a while.