Be skeptical of the affirmative’s claims to truly know Chinese foreign policy – the construction of China as threat is an ideological investment in the rationality of Western society.

It can be accepted that the study of the East as a whole was first taken by the decision of the Council in 1312 (Southern, 1962: 72; cited in Said, 2013: 59). Through the Arabic, Greek, Hebraic and Assyrian chairs established within this council, an attempt was made to learn about Eastern cultures (Ibid, 60). East was at that time a geographical East perceived by continental Europe. Greek and Hebraic cultures, which are included in today's ‘West’, were then considered to be part of the ‘East’ (Ibid, 60). In addition, there was no integrity about what and where the West is. For example, in the mediaeval period ‘for Britain the other was France, Catholic Church or others’ (Porter, 2013: 25). However, this started to change with the rise of European imperialism. Unlike the early colonization periods of the Iberian Peninsula, imperialism, which was based on establishing a permanent and dependent system, also started a process of recognition and shaping in parallel with its permanence. The fact that from 1815 to 1914 the area occupied by the European-ruled colonies increased from 35% to 85% of the world (Magdoff, 1974: 893) pointed to the beginning of the construction of a holistic East. In the Eastern construction, the quest to study the AP Hasan Deniz PEKŞEN 210 commonalities of the colonial regions and create ‘collective formulas’ had begun to appear as a method. Islam, which Europeans know most closely, was a convenient area for applying first formulas: (…) Therefore it remains, (…) an important subject of study, not only for abstract reasons connected with the history of law, civilization and religion, but also for practical purposes. The more intimate the relations of Europe with the Muslim East become, the more Muslim countries fall under European suzerainty, the more important it is for us Europeans to become acquainted (Hurgronje, 1899; cited in Bousquet and Schacht, 1957: 257; also cited in Said, 2013: 268). These collective formulas, which were applied to different parts of the East, were an imperialist practice of spreading and domination. A ‘superior West’ and ‘inferior East’ dichotomy took place at the ground of the formula. Within the scope of this dichotomy, three of the elements that Said treats as the four dogmas directly form the basis of Military Orientalism, a derivative form of orientalism: First dogma is the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant. undeveloped, inferior (Said, 2013: 314- 5). Third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself (Said, 1985: 97). Therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically objective. A fourth dogma is that the Orient is something either to be feared (…) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible) (Said, 2013: 314-315). Although the process of defining the East is a tool for constructing a holistic West (Said, 1994: 336), the main premise has been ‘as Said argues, is always and everywhere about Western superiority’ (Barkawi and Stanski, 2012: 9). At this point, Porter states that the perception of the ‘inferior East’, which is the subject of military orientalism, consists of four components. These are listed as ‘emotive, tribal, irrational and sensuous Orient and Orientals inclined to extremism and violence’ (Porter, 2013: 25). The reflection of the social components listed above appears in the classification of ‘Eastern war.’ According to this perspective, Eastern war based on ‘evasion, delaying and indirectness’ (Keegan, 1993: 387), is different from the Western war. When this argument is examined in a deeper sense, more open orientalist codes emerge. Since the West is ‘settled, creative and productive’, it finds new technologies and methods and therefore prefers face-to-face warfare. The East, on the other hand, is trying to make up for this lack of ‘creativity and Hasan Deniz PEKŞEN Alternatif Politika, 2024, 16 (2): 205-227 https://doi.org/10.53376/ap.2024.08 211 productivity’ with the Eastern War, which it has built on ‘ambush, treachery and deceit’ 1 (Keegan, 2001; cited by Gregory, 2012: 164-165). Thierry Camous, who also describes Eastern war based on the sacrificial culture created by incompetence, also defends his approach with similar statements as other military orientalists. In this approach, the ‘adequate West’ prefers face-to-face war. This approach is demonstrated as the duel culture at the individual level. In the face of this, there is an emphasis that the East, which is described as ‘poor and hopeless’, is trying to cover up its inadequacy in face-toface conflict with self-sacrifice: The case of kamikaze is another very explanatory element in terms of concepts that confront the status of the individual in the Easts and Wests. Westerners cannot understand the meaning of the kamikaze method that terrifies them, because it derives from the notion of another individual status. Kamikaze attacks are rare in the West except for unusual situations. (…) Christian religion and Western morality condemn suicide. The western victim, in particular, does not pursue death, prefer death only from dishonesty and vengeance. On the other hand, in the Muslim East, giving his life for war is regarded as a choice rather than a horror. Moreover, suicide is, first and foremost, a weapon of hopelessness and weak person. The death volunteer is able to reach its purpose much more effectively and with far less opportunity. So voluntary death is a weapon of the mystical, hopeless, and poor East. For the West, the death volunteer is a living symbol of a culturally frightening weapon (Camous, 2011: 439). Another component is the ‘emotive and irrational East’ conceptualization. This conceptualization proposes an ‘Eastern persona’ who motives in the light of cultural positioning rather than rationality. In this context cultural determinants like ‘blood ties’, ‘religious conformity’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘courage in society’ creates emotive motivations for Orientals because of their central position in social life. With this aspect, war in Eastern culture is a scattered reactions that can be made for ‘emotional (hence, often irrational) choices’, rather than an organization made to achieve rational political goals. This perspective can exemplify by evaluations on motivations of participation to war: (...) the death in battle of a Pashtun guerrilla invokes an obligation of revenge among all his male relatives, making the killing of a Taliban guerrilla an act of insurgent multiplication, not subtraction (Johnson and Mason, 2007: 80; cited by Porter, 2013: 152). 1 Derek Gregory was emphasizing that Keegan expresses his ideas in his article on the first armed Predator mission over Kabul and Kandahar. Considering that drone technology can be accepted as the opposite of face-to-face war, the controversy becomes more visible. AP Hasan Deniz PEKŞEN 212 Another component surrounding this emotive-irrational Oriental is the ‘tribal Oriental’. In the tribal Oriental component, images of ‘passive and undecided Oriental’, ‘emotional-irrational (and therefore) self-sacrificing Oriental’ and ‘Oriental, who need a leader since the prophet’ are intertwined. Johnson and Mason’s evaluation on the Taliban exemplify this perspective as well. Their assessment claimed that the focus of the struggle against Taliban should be on their leader Mullah Omar, because the charisma and legitimacy created by the ‘person wearing the cloak of the prophet’ can’t pass to someone else (Ibid, 151). Although it will be observed in the future how wrong it is, 2 it is a good example to reveal the codes. Said emphasizes that this is an orientalist tradition emphasized especially for Islamic societies. The basis of his emphasis is his quote from Grunebaum. Grunebaum states that ‘Islam absolutely and in all cases refuses to see man as the judge or measure of things (...) and is content with psychological truth’ (Von Grunebaum, 1964: 261). Said argues that as a result of this assumption, perception of a passive Oriental individual who acts in the direction of the tribe/leader has been reached (Said, 2013: 311). The components explained above created a basis for future orientalist production processes. However, this re-production process was not constructed in a free environment. The appearance of neo-orientalism and new barbarism concepts provided a general framework for military theorists. Thus, this period should be examined first.