Even if Realism isn’t inevitable, moving away from it leads to subjugation and extinction

Linklater rightly observes: ‘All such approaches—critical-theoretical, postmodern, feminist and liberal—have defined their identity through a series of challenges to neo-realism’ (p. 15). If he is also correct that ‘the theoretical challenge to neo-realism has largely succeeded’ (p. 23), why, one wonders, is Waltz’s theory still being used as the springboard for every conceivable theoretical discussion of international relations, even those as far removed from the concerns of neorealism as Linklater’s normative ideas about the transformation of citizenship and the modern political community? In other words, why have Waltz’s ideas become the standard grammar of the discipline? The answer is simple: neorealism remains the most coherent, elegant, and powerful theoretical perspective that addresses the central issues of the field, viz., war and peace, conflict and cooperation. Unparalleled in the clarity of its deductive logic, neorealism is the yardstick by which all other theories are measured and therefore the obvious target for those who believe they have built a better mousetrap. Since comprehensive and careful scrutiny of these so-called ‘successful challenges’ to neorealism is beyond the scope of this essay, a few brief observations about the constructivist research program will have to suffice for present purposes. Referring to Alexander Wendt’s constructivist challenge to neorealist theory, Linklater writes: ‘Neo-realism regards the learned and alterable behaviour of the major powers as inherent features of an immutable anarchy. But as an influential formulation correctly maintains, anarchy is what states make of it: the propensity for inter-state violence is not inherent in anarchy itself but is a function of how states have responded to inernational anarchy by constituting themselves as exclusionary and egotistical units’ (p. 18). Wendt’s claim that power politics is not a necessary consequence of anarchy is far less persuasive than Linklater suggests, however. In theory, Wendt is correct. An anarchic realm composed solely of angels, all with the certain knowledge that every other member is also a true angel and cannot be otherwise, might indeed be governed by other-regarding rather than self-regarding behaviour. If we introduce to this world the possibility of predation (a devil in disguise, so to speak), or one or two powerful undisguised devils, or a history of predation, self-regarding behaviour associated with power politics quickly emerges and drives out other-regarding behaviour. Wendt himself admits that a few bad apples will spoil the whole barrel. In practice, therefore, it is highly improbable that anarchy will ever lead to other-regarding behaviour. It is not my intention to denigrate Wendt’s theoretical insights, most of which I find quite compelling and all of which strike me as provocative and intelligent. It is simply to recognize that the task of the normative theorist is to imagine possible, if not entirely plausible, other worlds. Practitioners of international politics, however, understand that foreign policy is too serious a business to entertain utopian ideas about dramatically reconstructed social relations; confronted by weighty foreignpolicy decisions, they do not enjoy the luxury of retreating into a fantasy world of their own creation but instead must act under real-world constraints, knowing that bad judgment can lead to the subjugation or extinction of the state and its citizens.