Congress is undeniably united against China; All related legislation is unquestionably bipartisan.

In the past five years, the U.S. Congress has played an important role in designing and implementing America’s response to the challenge posed by a more powerful and nationalistic China. By the mid-2010s, it was apparent that China’s military modernization, aggressive (sometimes illegal) efforts to acquire advanced technology, protectionist economic policies, territorial encroachments, and other actions constituted a serious challenge, especially in the face of predictions that China might surpass the United States in economic output. Congress has responded accordingly, often working closely with the executive branch. Members have debated and passed a variety of measures aimed at strengthening the United States for a long-term competition and confrontation with China. They have introduced bills on a myriad of China-related issues, held a far-reaching set of hearings on the country, and increasingly raised China from the bully pulpit. Much of what Congress has achieved has been necessary, although there is a risk that it could go too far. Congressional concern about Beijing is of course one part of a broad trend in Washington’s policy discussion, and congressional action is one element in America’s response to China’s rise. But Congress still matters. The nature of congressional foreign policy powers gives it an important role to play in the design and implementation of the U.S. approach to China. The executive branch may often lead on foreign policy, but many key competencies for a strategy for long-term competition with China are subject to congressional legislation or influence. For example, defense spending, investment, and trade policy are all affected by congressional budgetary and other statutory powers.1 Members of Congress have somewhat different policy preferences when it comes to China, but there has been a surprising degree of bipartisanship in their assessments of the threat that China poses to the United States.2 As Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) observed in a speech in March 2022, a new consensus is emerging around the idea that “China is the most formidable near-peer adversary our nation has ever faced.”3 This is a notable statement, given the magnitude of the threat the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and imperial Japan once posed to the free world. Members’ policy preferences vary in the emphasis they place on the military, ideological, and economic aspects of the U.S.-China competition. They also vary based on how far members are willing to go on these issues, the degree of urgency they express, and their attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Some members take a view of China reminiscent of president Ronald Reagan’s view of the Soviet Union in his first term, when he called it the “evil empire” and greatly increased U.S. defense spending. For these members, there are grave, existential stakes for America in the unfolding competition. They see America as locked in an intense ideological rivalry with China, which they say aims to supplant the United States as the world’s superpower. They warn that unless America acts now, and forcefully, to counter China’s rise, the country will find itself hemmed in by China’s military, economic, and technological power in just a few years. Other members focus more heavily on the economic aspects of the competition. These economic hawks assess that the countries’ economic relationship is badly in need of reform. They agree with the “neo-Reaganites” that the problem is serious but focus on the need for measures to strengthen America’s domestic economic competitiveness in order to better compete with China. They hope that a healthier economic relationship will reduce other sources of tension and help stabilize U.S.-China relations over the long term. There also appear to be some moderates who share concern about Beijing’s actions but are less ready to make China the framing focus of U.S. foreign policy or rule out the possibility that China might still rise peacefully. These moderates, however, find themselves on the back foot in the face of a surge of political pressure to demonstrate toughness on China—a policy which, as one congressional staffer explained to us, has become a proxy for how members see America’s role in the world. To be tough on China is widely seen as reflecting a pro-American toughness that can appeal to voters on both sides of the aisle. Moderates may also hesitate to critique the consensus because China is one of the last remaining areas of bipartisanship on the Hill. As might be expected, Congress’s response to China has been driven at least in part by domestic politics. In the past five years, those pushing for a more aggressive response have mostly had the upper hand and those who might prefer a more moderate approach have found themselves on the back foot, concerned that attempts to moderate could be portrayed as weakness or as un-American to voters. Even as Congress enacts necessary legislation to protect America’s vital interests in the face of China’s rise, there is thus a risk of overshooting. Efforts to stabilize the relationship and find an acceptable modus vivendi with China—one that protects vital U.S. interests while avoiding war—could suffer. Moreover, Beijing is almost certainly listening to what Congress says, and the tone of congressional debate over China could contribute to suspicion, misperception, and thus escalation from China’s leaders. In this case, both sides will incur greater risks and costs across economic, financial, military, and human spheres. Moderate voices may need to speak with a louder voice to reduce the chances that Congress overshoots a well-reasoned policy response to the challenge that China poses. A bipartisan visit to Beijing in October 2023 led by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) suggests that some members now appreciate the need for such an approach, and this should be a welcome sign. Our research combines quantitative analysis of the large volume of bills that have been introduced in Congress in recent sessions with qualitative analysis of the main ideas and character of the debate, especially as expressed in the positions of congressional thought leaders. To understand this debate, we have relied on the Congressional Record, articles, speeches, and reporting on members’ views, as well as informal interviews with congressional staff from both parties. One challenge we encountered is that some members are more vocal in public about their views on China, and this may create bias in our sample. As researchers, however, we have to rely on these public statements, even though we recognize that they may or may not tell the whole story, and members who have said less in public may still hold developed views on China that differ from those of the more outspoken. Section one of this paper describes how congressional attention to China has increased in the past five years and outlines the major legislative muscle movements that have shaped U.S.-China relations. Section two then maps the thinking of key congressional thought leaders on China. Congressional Action on China Since 2020 Congressional attention to China has exploded since 2018. The number of bills introduced that Congress.gov codes as being about China increased sixfold between 2013 and 2021 (the 113th and 116th Congresses). During the 117th Congress, the most recent session to be completed, more bills were introduced on China than on the entire Middle East.4 In the process, Congress has moved to strengthen U.S. ties to Taiwan, authorized billions more in military spending for defeating China’s military, restricted China’s access to semiconductors, questioned the legitimacy of the CCP, and supported executive branch efforts to build a broad anti-China regional and global coalition. Since 2021, Congress has worked with but also been more aggressive than the administration of Joe Biden, whose approach has recently focused on restoring diplomatic communication with China. Very few voices in Congress have pushed for cooperation with China or taken a strong and vocal stance in favor of diplomacy, with the exception of the bipartisan delegation that Senator Schumer led to Beijing in October 2023. Many members believe there is still much more that needs to be done to defend America against China’s threats, judging from legislative initiatives and statements by congressional leaders as of fall 2023. The surge in Congress’s tough on China attitudes began with the 116th Congress in 2019,5 and they accelerated in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when anti-China sentiment in the United States intensified. For example, the Pew Research Center found that nearly 73 percent of Americans had an unfavorable opinion of China in July 2020, a 26 percent increase from 2018.6 An April 2020 Politico poll found that 31 percent of U.S. voters saw China as an “enemy,” an 11 percent increase from that January, before COVID-19 had spread widely in the United States.7 These broader trends are mirrored in the rise of China-related bills in recent sessions of Congress (see figure 1). Most pieces of draft China legislation that have come to a vote in the House of Representatives or the Senate passed with little or no debate. In part this is because congressional staff negotiate and revise the bills before any vote. But given the divisions in Congress on so many other policy issues, it is still striking that so much China-related legislation has passed with bipartisan support. For example, Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (S. 1838) and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 6256), two big pieces of human rights legislation, nearly unanimously and with bipartisan sponsorship in both houses. The same was true for the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 (H.R. 3919), which became law during the first session of the 117th Congress and prevents the U.S. Federal Communications Commission from issuing licenses to Chinese state-backed telecommunications companies. In the House, the Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021 (H.R. 1934) passed 405 to 20 during the 117th Congress, and the CHIPS and Science Act (H.R. 4346), which passed with bipartisan support in 2023 despite simultaneous high levels of partisan rancor. All Republicans and 146 Democrats also voted in favor of establishing the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Human Rights Figure 2 shows the extent to which Congress has increased its attention on China’s human rights abuses.8 Ten years ago, before Washington’s attention fixated on China, most legislation on the country focused on trade or human rights issues. Leading members of Congress often sought to highlight the issues of Tibet and the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre as a means of pushing back against what they perceived as the executive branch’s permissiveness on China. Congressional scrutiny of China’s human rights repression broadened in 2019, however, in response to Beijing’s repression of massive citizen protests in Hong Kong. Congress passed legislation over the second half of 2019 and in 2020 that condemned the repression, banned the export of certain weapons to the Hong Kong Police Force, and authorized the White House to revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status. At the same time, Congress responded to China’s mistreatment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region, with the House and Senate both introducing bipartisan bills in 2020 and 2021 to sanction Chinese government officials and prohibit the imports of goods manufactured with forced labor in Xinjiang. According to Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), who chaired one of the key hearings on the Senate version of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, “Nowhere is [China’s] assault on individual freedom and basic human rights more comprehensive and more atrocious than against the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.” Senator Rubio echoed his Democratic counterpart: “The crimes against humanity and genocide that are taking place at the hands of the CCP demand an urgent international response.”9 Some businesses pushed back against these bills, expressing concerns about the breadth of the restrictions, but both parties in Congress nevertheless ultimately backed the legislation, as did the White House. The legislation that President Biden signed into law in December 2021 thus prohibited imports of “any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” in Xinjiang unless they are proven not to be linked to forced labor—a remit with far-reaching implications for a range of U.S. industries.