Congress action key to disputes with China

In the past five years, the U.S. Congress has played an important role in designing and implementing America’s response to the challenge posed by a more powerful and nationalistic China. By the mid-2010s, it was apparent that China’s military modernization, aggressive (sometimes illegal) efforts to acquire advanced technology, protectionist economic policies, territorial encroachments, and other actions constituted a serious challenge, especially in the face of predictions that China might surpass the United States in economic output. Congress has responded accordingly, often working closely with the executive branch. Members have debated and passed a variety of measures aimed at strengthening the United States for a long-term competition and confrontation with China. They have introduced bills on a myriad of China-related issues, held a far-reaching set of hearings on the country, and increasingly raised China from the bully pulpit. Much of what Congress has achieved has been necessary, although there is a risk that it could go too far.

Congressional concern about Beijing is of course one part of a broad trend in Washington’s policy discussion, and congressional action is one element in America’s response to China’s rise. But Congress still matters. The nature of congressional foreign policy powers gives it an important role to play in the design and implementation of the U.S. approach to China. The executive branch may often lead on foreign policy, but many key competencies for a strategy for long-term competition with China are subject to congressional legislation or influence. For example, defense spending, investment, and trade policy are all affected by congressional budgetary and other statutory powers.1

Members of Congress have somewhat different policy preferences when it comes to China, but there has been a surprising degree of bipartisanship in their assessments of the threat that China poses to the United States.2 As Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) observed in a speech in March 2022, a new consensus is emerging around the idea that “China is the most formidable near-peer adversary our nation has ever faced.”3 This is a notable statement, given the magnitude of the threat the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and imperial Japan once posed to the free world. Members’ policy preferences vary in the emphasis they place on the military, ideological, and economic aspects of the U.S.-China competition. They also vary based on how far members are willing to go on these issues, the degree of urgency they express, and their attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Some members take a view of China reminiscent of president Ronald Reagan’s view of the Soviet Union in his first term, when he called it the “evil empire” and greatly increased U.S. defense spending. For these members, there are grave, existential stakes for America in the unfolding competition. They see America as locked in an intense ideological rivalry with China, which they say aims to supplant the United States as the world’s superpower. They warn that unless America acts now, and forcefully, to counter China’s rise, the country will find itself hemmed in by China’s military, economic, and technological power in just a few years. Other members focus more heavily on the economic aspects of the competition. These economic hawks assess that the countries’ economic relationship is badly in need of reform. They agree with the “neo-Reaganites” that the problem is serious but focus on the need for measures to strengthen America’s domestic economic competitiveness in order to better compete with China. They hope that a healthier economic relationship will reduce other sources of tension and help stabilize U.S.-China relations over the long term. There also appear to be some moderates who share concern about Beijing’s actions but are less ready to make China the framing focus of U.S. foreign policy or rule out the possibility that China might still rise peacefully. These moderates, however, find themselves on the back foot in the face of a surge of political pressure to demonstrate toughness on China—a policy which, as one congressional staffer explained to us, has become a proxy for how members see America’s role in the world. To be tough on China is widely seen as reflecting a pro-American toughness that can appeal to voters on both sides of the aisle. Moderates may also hesitate to critique the consensus because China is one of the last remaining areas of bipartisanship on the Hill. As might be expected, Congress’s response to China has been driven at least in part by domestic politics. In the past five years, those pushing for a more aggressive response have mostly had the upper hand and those who might prefer a more moderate approach have found themselves on the back foot, concerned that attempts to moderate could be portrayed as weakness or as un-American to voters. Even as Congress enacts necessary legislation to protect America’s vital interests in the face of China’s rise, there is thus a risk of overshooting. Efforts to stabilize the relationship and find an acceptable modus vivendi with China—one that protects vital U.S. interests while avoiding war—could suffer. Moreover, Beijing is almost certainly listening to what Congress says, and the tone of congressional debate over China could contribute to suspicion, misperception, and thus escalation from China’s leaders. In this case, both sides will incur greater risks and costs across economic, financial, military, and human spheres. Moderate voices may need to speak with a louder voice to reduce the chances that Congress overshoots a well-reasoned policy response to the challenge that China poses. A bipartisan visit to Beijing in October 2023 led by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) suggests that some members now appreciate the need for such an approach, and this should be a welcome sign. Our research combines quantitative analysis of the large volume of bills that have been introduced in Congress in recent sessions with qualitative analysis of the main ideas and character of the debate, especially as expressed in the positions of congressional thought leaders. To understand this debate, we have relied on the Congressional Record, articles, speeches, and reporting on members’ views, as well as informal interviews with congressional staff from both parties. One challenge we encountered is that some members are more vocal in public about their views on China, and this may create bias in our sample. As researchers, however, we have to rely on these public statements, even though we recognize that they may or may not tell the whole story, and members who have said less in public may still hold developed views on China that differ from those of the more outspoken. Section one of this paper describes how congressional attention to China has increased in the past five years and outlines the major legislative muscle movements that have shaped U.S.-China relations. Section two then maps the thinking of key congressional thought leaders on China.

Congressional Action on China Since 2020

Congressional attention to China has exploded since 2018. The number of bills introduced that Congress.gov codes as being about China increased sixfold between 2013 and 2021 (the 113th and 116th Congresses). During the 117th Congress, the most recent session to be completed, more bills were introduced on China than on the entire Middle East.4 In the process, Congress has moved to strengthen U.S. ties to Taiwan, authorized billions more in military spending for defeating China’s military, restricted China’s access to semiconductors, questioned the legitimacy of the CCP, and supported executive branch efforts to build a broad anti-China regional and global coalition. Since 2021, Congress has worked with but also been more aggressive than the administration of Joe Biden, whose approach has recently focused on restoring diplomatic communication with China. Very few voices in Congress have pushed for cooperation with China or taken a strong and vocal stance in favor of diplomacy, with the exception of the bipartisan delegation that Senator Schumer led to Beijing in October 2023. Many members believe there is still much more that needs to be done to defend America against China’s threats, judging from legislative initiatives and statements by congressional leaders as of fall 2023. The surge in Congress’s tough on China attitudes began with the 116th Congress in 2019,5 and they accelerated in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when anti-China sentiment in the United States intensified. For example, the Pew Research Center found that nearly 73 percent of Americans had an unfavorable opinion of China in July 2020, a 26 percent increase from 2018.6 An April 2020 Politico poll found that 31 percent of U.S. voters saw China as an “enemy,” an 11 percent increase from that January, before COVID-19 had spread widely in the United States.7 These broader trends are mirrored in the rise of China-related bills in recent sessions of Congress (see figure 1). Most pieces of draft China legislation that have come to a vote in the House of Representatives or the Senate passed with little or no debate. In part this is because congressional staff negotiate and revise the bills before any vote. But given the divisions in Congress on so many other policy issues, it is still striking that so much China-related legislation has passed with bipartisan support. For example, Congress passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (S. 1838) and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R. 6256), two big pieces of human rights legislation, nearly unanimously and with bipartisan sponsorship in both houses. The same was true for the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 (H.R. 3919), which became law during the first session of the 117th Congress and prevents the U.S. Federal Communications Commission from issuing licenses to Chinese state-backed telecommunications companies. In the House, the Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021 (H.R. 1934) passed 405 to 20 during the 117th Congress, and the CHIPS and Science Act (H.R. 4346), which passed with bipartisan support in 2023 despite simultaneous high levels of partisan rancor. All Republicans and 146 Democrats also voted in favor of establishing the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

Human Rights

Figure 2 shows the extent to which Congress has increased its attention on China’s human rights abuses.8 Ten years ago, before Washington’s attention fixated on China, most legislation on the country focused on trade or human rights issues. Leading members of Congress often sought to highlight the issues of Tibet and the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre as a means of pushing back against what they perceived as the executive branch’s permissiveness on China. Congressional scrutiny of China’s human rights repression broadened in 2019, however, in response to Beijing’s repression of massive citizen protests in Hong Kong. Congress passed legislation over the second half of 2019 and in 2020 that condemned the repression, banned the export of certain weapons to the Hong Kong Police Force, and authorized the White House to revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status. At the same time, Congress responded to China’s mistreatment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region, with the House and Senate both introducing bipartisan bills in 2020 and 2021 to sanction Chinese government officials and prohibit the imports of goods manufactured with forced labor in Xinjiang. According to Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), who chaired one of the key hearings on the Senate version of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, “Nowhere is [China’s] assault on individual freedom and basic human rights more comprehensive and more atrocious than against the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.” Senator Rubio echoed his Democratic counterpart: “The crimes against humanity and genocide that are taking place at the hands of the CCP demand an urgent international response.”9

Some businesses pushed back against these bills, expressing concerns about the breadth of the restrictions, but both parties in Congress nevertheless ultimately backed the legislation, as did the White House. The legislation that President Biden signed into law in December 2021 thus prohibited imports of “any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part” in Xinjiang unless they are proven not to be linked to forced labor—a remit with far-reaching implications for a range of U.S. industries.

Security and Defense

In absolute numbers, legislative action on China’s human rights record has increased since 2019, but human rights represented a smaller share of the overall China-related legislation than in the past. Congressional action on many other issues is more novel and has grown in breadth and scope since 2020. Defense spending is one of the biggest areas of increase. Congress has worked in a variety of ways to refocus Pentagon strategy on China and guide executive branch policymaking, for example by requesting strategies and reports on key aspects of China policy. In the process, Congress has sometimes been more aggressive than even the military itself, pushing the U.S. Defense Department to shift resources to the Indo-Pacific and adapt its plans more quickly to China’s rising military power. Defense- and intelligence-related legislation in figure 3 encompasses legislation that we coded as aiming to prevent China from acquiring U.S. intelligence and dual-use technology, deter war with China, prepare the United States and partners for a conflict over Taiwan, condemn China’s interference in U.S. elections, and other military and intelligence issues. Most congressional action related to the Pentagon, however, takes place within the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which is only one piece of legislation but encompasses a vast range of military and defense actions, many of which are now aimed directly or indirectly at fighting China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The result is that figure 3, if anything, greatly understates the extent to which Congress has focused on security measures to counter China’s rise. Moreover, the NDAA now includes a broad range of China measures that are only tangentially related to defense. The most recent NDAA versions in the House and Senate, for example, included content on China largely unrelated to military programs, such as limits on the production of Chinese films; measures on China-related economic topics, including fentanyl and electric vehicle supply chains; measures targeting Confucius Institutes in the United States; and measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as proposed sanctions on the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which some members of Congress believe was the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Military Preparedness

Concerns about China pervade the NDAA, even when the country is not specified by name. The vast majority of the nearly $1 trillion in defense spending that Congress authorizes is thus affected by deep concerns with China’s military modernization and the challenges that it is thought to pose to U.S. dominance in Asia and elsewhere. For example, Congress has called for more funding for long-range anti-ship cruise missiles on multiple launch platforms, the hardening of U.S. bases in the region against air attacks, the construction of additional bases, the expansion of the U.S. Navy, the arming of Taiwan, and the supporting of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) program of activities. Members of Congress have also pressed the White House and the Pentagon to accelerate efforts on several of these fronts and required official Pentagon reports on issues such as China’s naval base construction plans in Africa. Mentions of China in the NDAA have increased almost tenfold in the past five years, from 32 in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 NDAA (which passed in 2017) to 268 in the FY 2023 NDAA (which passed in 2022). There are also thirteen mentions of the “CCP” in the 2023 legislation, compared with zero in the 2018 version.

The Select Committee

On January 10, 2023, in one of the first acts of the 117th Congress, the House voted to create the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party by a vote of 365 to 65. All of the no votes came from Democrats, who were concerned the committee would be a partisan affair, but 146 Democrats still voted in favor—another sign of bipartisan concern about China. Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI), a well-credentialed “China hawk” with a doctoral degree and military experience, was named chair of the committee. The select committee is charged with investigating and making recommendations to Congress, so it does not have a jurisdiction like the standing House committees. Some of its members are also on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, however, and the select committee has a staff that can produce draft bills for members to introduce. This arrangement tends to increase the total volume of bills circulating in Congress on China. Since its creation, the committee has held hearings on many subjects related to U.S.-China strategic competition, including the repression of Uyghurs, China’s competition practices, risks to American companies in China, critical and emerging technologies, and the “Chinese Communist Party’s Threat to America.” Some sense of Congress’s current military priorities can be gleaned from the 2023 report of the select committee, which identified ten investments for Congress to adopt:

The deployment of more long-range missiles and unmanned vehicles to Asia.

Coordination and planning with allies for a crisis over Taiwan.

Improving combined training between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries.

Faster delivery of weapons that Congress has already approved for Taiwan.

Creation of a high-ranking military headquarters for war with China.

Reducing the vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to cyber-attacks.

Strengthening Taiwan against cyber attacks.

Strengthening operational integration and planning of U.S. and Taiwan forces.

Strengthening U.S. bases in the region against PLA strikes.

Increasing U.S. ability to resupply Taiwan in a crisis or war.10

Even though the select committee is only an advisory committee, many of these recommendations were adopted in the 2024 House and Senate versions of the NDAA.11 Congress has also pushed more and more funds into the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which has been part of the annual defense bill since 2021.12 Congressional thinking about the initiative was first outlined in a May 2020 article in War on the Rocks by Senators Jim Inhofe (R-OK) and Jack Reed (D-RI), who argued that Congress needed a way to direct more military funds to Asia.13 Ultimately, the 2021 NDAA authorized $1.4 billion for the initiative, and Congress has appropriated more money to the program every year since, while simultaneously criticizing the Pentagon for being too slow to deliver on the plans.14 The 2022 NDAA authorized $7.1 billion, $2 billion over the Pentagon request; the 2023 NDAA authorized $11.5 billion, while the Department of Defense requested $6.1 billion.15 The 2024 NDAA package currently includes $9.7 billion for the initiative, $600 million over the Defense Department’s request. These military measures have enjoyed widespread support, with only mild pushback.

Preventing China’s Military From Acquiring U.S. Technology

Strengthening U.S. military capabilities is one approach to countering the PLA. Another is to weaken China’s military modernization by cutting off its access to U.S. technology and resources.

To cut off potential access to U.S. technology, Congress expanded the remit of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in the 2019 NDAA. More recently, it has moved to cut off U.S. investment in China that could benefit the PLA, through legislation sponsored by Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) and John Cornyn (R-TX) and included in the July 2023 Senate NDAA as the Outbound Investment Transparency Act.16 That act passed the Senate 91–6, but became less relevant when the White House introduced its own outbound investment regulation in August 2023 by executive order.17 Bipartisan support for these measures remains strong, with only some dissent from traditional Republicans, such as Representative Patrick McHenry (R-NC), who are concerned about further limitations on U.S.-China trade and investment. Others may also have concerns but have kept quiet.

Congress, Strategic Ambiguity, and the “One China” Policy

Much of the relevant congressional debate and legislation over military systems and posture aimed at China has focused on supporting Taiwan’s defense against an attack, but Congress has also pressed the White House for a tougher policy line on Taiwan. According to the United States’ “One China” policy, Washington recognizes the government in Beijing as the sole government of China and does not recognize the government in Taipei. The United States is nevertheless prepared to defend Taiwan against an attack under some circumstances. Washington has been careful not to specify the circumstances, focusing instead on maintaining strategic ambiguity. That ambiguity reduces the chances that a U.S. security guarantee will embolden Taipei into declaring independence from mainland China, but also helps deter Beijing from considering a military operation to retake Taiwan.18

The most vocal congressional advocates of a shift away from strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan have been on the right. In May 2020, for example, Representative Gallagher called for an end to strategic ambiguity in the National Review.19 In June 2020 and 2021, Gallagher, Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), Senator Rick Scott (R-FL), Representative Guy Reschenthaler (R-PA), and representative Ted Yoho (R-FL) introduced a series of bills that included a preemptive authorization for the use of military force to defend Taiwan, the reestablishment of the U.S. Navy’s Taiwan Patrol Force, and an end to the policy of strategic ambiguity.20 None of these Republican bills on Taiwan made it to a vote in committee, but they represented the growing tendency among some more hawkish members of Congress.

The right is not the only source of support for a possible change in U.S. strategy, however. For example, Elaine Luria (D-VA), former vice chair of House Armed Services Committee, published a Washington Post op-ed in October 2021 titled “Congress Must Untie Biden’s Hands on Taiwan,” arguing that Congress needed to preauthorize the use of force for the defense of Taiwan.21 Her logic was that doing so would not mean ending strategic ambiguity, but that not doing so could lead to delays in the U.S. military response. The latter may or may not be accurate, given that the executive branch normally invokes Article 2 of the Constitution in such situations and has some leeway under the War Powers Act to commence military operations prior to congressional approval. In either case, however, Beijing almost certainly would view preauthorization as Washington bolstering its commitment to Taipei.

Indeed, President Biden himself may share the view that strategic ambiguity is unwise. On at least four occasions, he has said without qualification that the United States would defend Taiwan if China attacked.22 Nevertheless, the gap between congressional thinking on Taiwan and White House policy was thrown into relief in August 2022 when then House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei, despite White House objections to her doing so.23 Pelosi had long made human rights a cornerstone of her approach to China, but the decision to go to Taiwan at a moment when the White House was working to turn down the temperature with Beijing indicated the distance between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government on the issue. Pelosi’s visit met with a sharp rebuke from China that included a barrage of intensified PLA operations around Taiwan.

On the heels of Pelosi’s visit, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations then met to debate a controversial bill called the Taiwan Policy Act (S. 4428) that had the dual sponsorship of none other than the committee’s then chair, Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and his Republican counterpart, Senator James Risch (R-ID). Here was the closest Congress had come to shifting the United States away from the “One China” policy and strategic ambiguity. The legislation would have upgraded U.S. relations with Taiwan by requiring Senate confirmation of the U.S. representative in Taipei, made Taiwan a major non-NATO ally, provided Taiwan with $6 billion in additional defense funds, and made harsh sanctions on China automatic in the event of aggression.24

A frank debate over the merits of the bill ensued. Senator Menendez, who had authored the bill, wanted to project congressional unity, probably because he believed it would send a clear message to Beijing. However, several senators objected to the proposed change in long-standing U.S. policy. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) was the most outspoken, but he had support from several other senators in his dissent. Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI), for example, wondered whether or not “we are getting anything out of the more provocative statutory changes that, in my judgment, may irritate the Chinese and accelerate their preparation for military action.” Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) worried the bill was “doing something that is highly provocative and bellicose” and wanted any military support to Taiwan to be low-key, so that it did not lead Beijing to conclude that preemptive war was needed. Senator Kaine expressed the same concern that the bill would needlessly provoke Beijing, as did Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD). Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) also warned it would “heighten tensions and ramp up the cycle of conflict” while raising concerns among regional allies who needed assurance that the United States is doing everything that it can to avoid a conflict.25

In spite of these concerns, the committee approved the bill by a 17–5 vote, with Schatz, Murphy, Markey, Paul, and Van Hollen all voting no. A revised version of the bill nevertheless moved forward and became part of the FY 2023 NDAA as the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA). Although some of its key measures, such as $2 billion in grants to the Taiwan military, were not funded in the annual omnibus spending bill, the TERA authority remains in place through 2028. The episode was a clear example of the extent to which senior members of Congress from both parties were prepared to push the White House to adopt a more aggressive direction against Beijing on Taiwan.

Economic Statecraft and Decoupling From China

Congress has also aimed to adjust U.S. domestic and foreign economic policy to make the United States more competitive and less vulnerable to being cut off from production lines in China. In the process, concerns about China have helped enable the broader U.S. industrial policy desired by many Democrats, including the most far-reaching industrial policy legislation in U.S. history. Beginning in early 2021, majority leadership in Congress, working closely with the Biden administration, introduced and debated multiple versions of bills aimed at strengthening the United States for a long-term economic and technological competition with China. These efforts are a direct response to the underlying geopolitical challenge the China’s economic rise presents to the United States. An early Senate bill, known as the Endless Frontier Act (S. 3832), passed the floor of the Senate in June 2021 as the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 (S. 1260). A related bill passed the House in February 2022. The $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act (H.R. 4346) went to a full vote in August 2022, passing both houses with bipartisan support. This act aims to reduce U.S. reliance on China’s semiconductor supply chains through subsidies and tax credits. It also aims to strengthen U.S. technology research with funds for education, and research and development in sectors such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and computing. The bill, which was pushed by the Biden administration and had nearly unanimous support from Democrats, was not popular with all Republicans, some of whom raised questions about the introduction of a more heavy-handed state approach to competition with China. Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), for example, warned that: “we will not beat China by copying its strategy.”26 Nevertheless, the final tally of 24 House Republicans voting in favor, with 187 voting against, understates the degree of Republican support, because the party leadership whipped against the bill at the eleventh hour due to partisan fighting over a separate bill that eventually became the Inflation Reduction Act. In fact, most Republicans supported CHIPS because they viewed semiconductors as an area of national security competition and were thus willing to put aside long-standing objections to industrial policy to back it. Objections they did voice targeted provisions that were not central to the bill, such as the requirement that companies that received subsidies offer childcare for their workforce.27 The bill might not have made it through Congress without the overarching climate of concern about China, and recognition of this reality may encourage some Democrats to be more accepting of Congress’s tough on China trend.

Trade Restrictions Targeting Unfair Competition From China

This historic boost to industrial policy came on top of long-standing congressional efforts to put a stop to China’s evasions and violations of WTO rules, such as through state subsidies to its export industry, its export restraints, and its efforts to acquire Western intellectual property, sometimes illegally. The most important policy innovation on this front is a growing interest in instituting an annual review of China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status—or even revoking it altogether—in an effort to coerce China into passing long-needed reforms.

This is not yet the predominant policy position among legislators in the Republican or Democratic Parties, but the idea is gaining ground. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), for example, has introduced draft legislation to this effect for the past three sessions of Congress.28 He has more recently been joined by other Republican senators such as Hawley.29 So far, this bill has not been voted on in committee and still only receives sponsorships from senators on the right, such as Scott, Ted Budd (R-NC), and JD Vance (R-OH). Representative Jim Banks (R-IN) also introduced a bill to this effect in July 2023, and the select committee on the CCP is pushing in a similar direction, for example in a May 2023 hearing with Robert Lighthizer, former president Trump’s trade representative, who advocates for punitive tariffs on China. The 2024 Republican presidential primary may further encourage congressional Republicans to take a more critical view of China’s normal trade status. In March 2023, for example, Fox News host Maria Bartiromo asked Senator Rubio whether he would “be in favor of revoking China’s MFN [most favored nation] status when it comes to trade,” to which he responded “absolutely.”30 Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and former president Trump both agreed.31 Congressional Democrats also are warming to the idea of higher tariffs on China, at least as a means of coercing China into changing its political economic practices. Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA), for example, who is on the select committee, has endorsed the possibility, at least in the form of putting it up for an annual vote.32 To these voices can be added those with long-standing opposition to the liberalization of trade with China in the first place, such as Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), who touts that his vote against giving China preferential trade status during Bill Clinton’s presidency.33 Judging from informal conversations with Hill staff, some other progressives appear hesitant so far to take this more radical approach, lest it generate further tensions with Beijing.