Injunctions solve---incentivize innovation and cooperation but weak IP rights allow large corporations to delay negotiations
Manne et al 20 (Geoffrey A. Manne is the president and founder of the International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) and a distinguished fellow at Northwestern Law School’s Searle Center on Law, Regulation, & Economic Growth, Kristian Stout is a Fellow at the Internet Law & Policy Foundry, as well as the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Julian Morris is a Senior Scholar at the International Center for Law & Economics, Dirk Auer is the Senior Fellow for Law & Economics at the International Center for Law & Economics, Aug 11, 2020, The Federalist Society, “The Deterioration of Appropriate Remedies in Patent Disputes”, https://fedsoc.org/fedsoc-review/the-deterioration-of-appropriate-remedies-in-patent-disputes)
Injunctions, in particular, play a critical role in cementing these rights.[17] Perhaps more than any other tool, they guarantee that the unlawful use of inventions can quickly be terminated by the rightsholder. In so doing, they bring potential licensees to the negotiating table. And, by the same token, weakening patent rights may result in patent holdout, whereby firms strategically decide to infringe others’ patents or delay license negotiations.[18] Even if one ignores the reduced incentives to innovate that this may entail (i.e., it damages the inventor’s ability to recoup costs and threatens the viability of commercialization opportunities),[19] this type of behavior has other highly deleterious effects as well. For example, patent holders may respond by resorting to expanded reliance upon trade secret protection and otherwise inefficient vertical integration.[20] This may reduce the number of commercialized inventions either overall or that ultimately fall into the public domain twenty years later (after a patent would have expired). Similarly, the inability to enforce their rights may discourage rightsholders from taking part in collaborative efforts to develop new technologies (e.g., through standardization efforts), similarly constraining the extent of valuable innovation. In short, on the margins, reducing the incentives provided by the patent system will tend to lower the relative openness of technology- and science-driven industries. Particularly in highly dynamic industries characterized by fast-paced change and cross-pollination of ideas through fluid employment and rapid development cycles, weakening IP protection can have a dramatic effect. Firms in dynamic markets need some ability to appropriate and protect the fruits of their labor.[21] Reducing the protection afforded by patents will urge them to turn toward inferior (costlier, slower, etc.) alternatives to achieve this protection. In other words, injunctions and related doctrines provide property holders with the ability to operate quickly and in the open with the knowledge that they can continue to adequately commercialize their inventions.