Genomic governmentality results in genetic reductionism—this modern eugenics uses neoliberalism to discipline subjects based on pseudoscientific determinism

Eva, phD candidate at the University of Sussex. “Intellectual Property and the Genetic Dispositif of Life: The Changing Role of Intellectual Property Law in Governing Participation and Knowledge in the Bioeconomy.” Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Sussex, May 2015. Pp 113-115. LJS

Advances in the information sciences44 were central to the development of the informational-genetic conception of life (and the ‘genetic dispositif’). The abstract, “disembodied” conception of information made the definition of the qualitative content of life effectively lose its connection to the physical world and became “one of the major assumptions behind the gradual “encoding” of genetics during the same period” (Thacker 2005a, 98). Kay highlights the scriptural element of this code (reminiscent of the apparatus of writing establishing the corpus of statistical knowledge of populations of the 19th century) and states “this view of the genome as information system, a linguistic text written in DNA code, has been guiding theories and practices of molecular biologists since the 1950s” (Kay 2000, xv; also Nelkin and Lindee 1995). In this “[genetic] reductionist framework what is of greatest value is the code”, Thacker argues, and “this relationship between DNA, database, and value is made more concrete in commercial genome databases […] as well as in the U.S. PTO database categories containing patents on genes and gene-related compounds” (Thacker 2005a, 101 f.). IP law thus concretises the informational content of life, and acts as a depository of the disembodied genetic code. This ‘informationalised’ abstract scriptural notion of life traversed the boundaries of biology and economy, giving rise to ‘value’ that can be circulated in the bioeconomy. IPRs are crucial for both defining the monopolistic knowledge-object that can be circulated, and also for the accruement of value on the basis of licensing fees and monopolies in the market. But IP law also became immersed in a wider political project outside of science and the economy. The “Science of Man” vision of life became a very successful determining force in identity formation, a formidable point of reference for definition of a new somatic ethics (N. Rose 2008a) 45 determining the parameters of ‘responsible’ healthy living of individuals and populations, and the gene became a “cultural icon” (Nelkin and Lindee 1995) in its own right. A genetic dispositif emerged that contained an all-encompassing genetic reductionist account of the essence of life in the scientific sector and in the cultural realm, promoted by its abstract informational promiscuity. Cooper argues that the connection between the emergence of the informationalised life science sector and neoliberal economy was especially productive, leading to a huge influx of venture capital (Cooper 2008) and increasing the dominance of the genetic-molecular vision of life. This connection has also been noted by other scholars (for example N. Rose 2007b; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; 2009). The connection between informational-genetic accounts of life and the circulation of this information in the economy has been one of the distinguishing features in the “neoliberal revolution” as Cooper points out (Cooper 2008, 3). She understands neoliberalism as a qualitatively different stage of governmental and economic development to that of liberalism, in which an intensified emphasis on financialisation and an enhancement of societal differences are the result of the limitation of the state’s role to the construction and maintenance of the financial markets and the conditions for trade within it. She describes this process as an “ever-tighter alliance between state-funded research, the market in new technologies, and financial capital” (Ibid.), and argues “the very value of knowledge […] is the result of a quite deliberate self-transformation of the U.S. economy and that of its allies, one that was pursued through the international organizations created in the post-World War II era, but with the ultimate effect of entirely redefining the landscape of world trade and imperialism.” (Ibid., 57) The effect of this strategy was very noticeable: “[i]n the United States in particular these interventions had a resounding effect on the life sciences. […] The project of U.S. neoliberalism, I argue […], is crucially concerned with the emergent possibilities of the life sciences and related disciplines” (Ibid., 3). IP law acted as a central method for the financialisation of life’s potentiality in neoliberalism’s “ever-tighter alliance” between knowledge, the market, and capital. It thus worked for the market – but it also contributed to the structuring of the biotech sector and the promotion of certain research agendas over others. This introduced IP law to the informational-genetic conception of DNA – which resulted in the inevitable adoption of the genetic-informational conception of life in the Myriad decision, even at the expense of some categories of patentability of isolated genetic sequences. But Myriad’s uneasy compromise ensuring the continued patentability of some genetic sequences also highlights the persisting relevance of IP for the creation of ‘value’ from life in the economy. It is argued in the last section of this chapter that IP’s relationship with knowledge goes beyond this creation of value, encompassing the promotion of one form of scientific knowledge over other competing accounts of life. Rouvroy finds that “[g]enetic reductionism is encouraged by the patentability of genes and gene sequences” (Rouvroy 2008, 41). This draws attention to the way in which IPRs act as an economic device that promotes the predominance and normalisation of genetic truth discourses, encouraged by the criteria of patentability. However, it neglects to point out that this patentability relied on a chemical-molecular understanding of genetics in IP law, and that this patentability was recently limited in the Myriad decision. This not only endangered value creation but also IP’s contribution to the normalisation of an accepted canon of knowledge based on a predominant scientific paradigm. Genetic reductionism according to the “central dogma” understands the genetic code’s function as the determining force within the organism instead of allowing for more complex interactions with environmental factors. This produces relatively predictable and stable accounts of the body and illness on the basis of the genetic code. A focus on the promotion of predictable knowledge and its connection to patentability highlights another facet of the Myriad decision: it continued to maintain some form of gene patents in the face of competing, more complex accounts of life – which would pose more serious problems for patentability and for questions of governing.