Iran will never escalate—capabilities, military, and allies

despite the recent escalation there remain critical constraints on the ability of both Iran and Israel to escalate further to a level of conflict which might qualify as all-out war. These constraints are determined not only by political and geostrategic considerations but by the military balance between the two states. While both sides have relatively large defence establishments, they are structurally offset (with each force emphasising different capabilities) and neither side possesses adequate military capabilities to fight a sustained and direct conflict with the other. Excluding Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability, both sides arguably lack the ability to overwhelm militarily the other. Iran’s physical size, the dispersal of its assets and its arsenal of asymmetric proxies give it a resilience which compensates for it being outgunned by Israel. The latter has shown that it has not only sophisticated defences but also partners willing to supplement them with critical capabilities. The two states have primarily configured their armed forces not to fight a war against each other but to serve broader strategic objectives: Israel’s are to defend its territory and borders from hostile neighbours, including through forward operations, while Iran’s are to protect its government and to project into asymmetric conflicts. But their force structures have been determined by wars of survival rather than of conquest. The Iranian government’s distrust of the imperial army led to it sidelining the conventional armed forces in favour of its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and volunteer paramilitary group, the Basij, both charged with defending the Islamic Republic. Iran has also invested heavily in its external asymmetric capability, creating and maintaining a network of regional partners with which it shares strategic aims, ideological affinity (to varying degrees) and, critically, weapons systems. Israel has historically geared its armed forces to defending against state-level aggression from well-armed neighbouring states (Syria and Egypt) and latterly from asymmetric non-state armed groups (NSAGs), leaving it with a powerful mix of domain-dominance and intelligence-based capabilities. But while it has powerful strike capabilities, it has not designed its armed forces to fight expeditionary wars beyond its immediate periphery. The two states have differing levels of battle-readiness in personnel and equipment. Iran has a mass-recruitment policy for its domestic security apparatus, of which only a small percentage have combat experience, although the number rises within the elite Quds Force unit and amongst members of its proxy, Hizbullah. This contrasts with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), whose reservists, professional soldiers and weapons systems have accumulated experience in multiple conflicts. But the IDF, despite its record of power projection, has not yet tested its ability to project into Iran other than through aerial and intelligence means. Iranian equipment, particularly uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile systems, is in use both with state actors (Russia, Sudan and Syria) and NSAGs. Iran’s indigenous research and development cycle is well developed, as the production and export of its Shahed-series UAVs and ballistic and cruise missiles has shown. This and the state’s own military-industrial complex will give some of its weapons systems readiness and resilience. But its production and research facilities will also present Israel with high-value targets. A further determinant of the military balance is each side’s ability to leverage their partnerships and alliances. Iran’s partners are geared towards asymmetric conflict with Israel and can be relied on to defend Iran and, to varying degrees, supplement its offensive actions. That stands in contrast to Israel’s partners, who will be cautious if not openly opposed to Israel undertaking direct operations against Iran. Israel can, however, be confident in United States President Joe Biden’s recent statements that the US will defend it against any further Iranian attacks, and in the strong showing of Israel’s partners in actively defending it against Iranian missiles.