U.S heg in East Asia is impossible

The final thing the U.S. should do is stop signaling its hopes of fundamentally changing who holds power in Beijing and instead focus on its own affairs. In July 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a speech on China that some hawks interpreted as calling for a policy of regime change. Critics of Beijing regularly argue that the Chinese take too dogmatic an approach to issues of national sovereignty, all but admitting that mutual hostility between the powers is rooted in the desire of many in the U.S. to overthrow the government of Xi Jinping and end CCP rule, if not militarily than by encouraging internal discord. Of course, the U.S. has no ability to overthrow, at acceptable cost, the Chinese government or fundamentally change its political culture. Setting such goals makes cooperation in areas like disease prevention and climate change more difficult.

Throughout history, countries have exercised power abroad due to economic success, the factor on which great power influence rests. For the U.S. to compete with China, it should invest internally: infrastructure improvements, GDP growth, improved educational outcomes, and other measures to increase innovation and wealth creation. While such goals are difficult to achieve, it is easy to see that increasing spending on a military competition with China in its own backyard is not helpful.

U.S. influence in East Asia is destined to diminish, but that does not make America less safe. Those most fearful of China who call for more military spending, overextension, and a commitment to marshalling allies do not present any policy ideas that can reverse underlying trends, even if adopted. Throughout the Indo-Pacific, China has the advantages of geography and a relatively passive attitude toward the affairs of the rest of the world. While those advantages will continue, it is in the process of approaching and surpassing the U.S. in all measures of economic power, and to a great extent in technological and scientific achievement, all of which can be converted into superior military strength if there is a will to do so. That reality is an argument to strengthen the U.S. internally to prepare for long-term competition, if necessary. Old habits of thinking, overly optimistic analyses assuming Chinese decline or collapse, and ignoring the basic principle of compound growth have prevented the U.S. from grappling with the speed and magnitude of the shifting balance of power we are experiencing. Washington is left with the choice of either adjusting to the new reality or risking catastrophe to try and stop what is inevitable.

President Biden’s vision of competition with China requires the U.S. to look inward. As he correctly recognizes, a country that cannot solve problems at home will be in no position to preserve its influence abroad. However, if the U.S. is to ensure democracy wins the war of ideas, the world’s most important democracy cannot set standards that are impossible to meet. Making America a model for the rest of the world is achievable, while maintaining itself as the dominant power in East Asia in the face of a rising China is not. All policies related to great power competition should proceed with that understanding in mind.