Wrong – globalization begets instability by raising interdependence – 2008 recession and Eurozone go for de-dev
Jackson 9 {Tim, ecological economist and professor of sustainable development (Surrey), Professorial Fellow to the Economic and Social Research Council, “Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet,” London: Earthscan, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga13/prosperity.pdf}
This is not to suggest that the UK is alone in facing the severity of the current crisis. On the contrary, in an increasingly globalized world, it was difficult for any country to escape the recession. Even those economics — like Germany, Japan and China — which retained strong manufacturing sectors, largely avoided consumer debt and delivered strong public sector surpluses, still suffered. During the last quarter of 2008, Germany's economy sank faster than any other European nation, contracting by 2.1 per cent." Ironically, Germany had found it hard to increase domestic consumption fast enough over the preceding decade. Unable to persuade its own consumers to spend, it had achieved growth by building a strong manufacturing sector and exporting to countries like the US where consumers were still prepared to spend rather than save. But when credit collapsed and consumer spending slowed everywhere, these export markets dried up too, hitting the German economy harder than most. Differences in the structure of economic growth hold some interesting lessons for the challenge of devising a sustainable economy. We'll return to the implications of this in later chapters. What's clear for now is that the roots of the economic crisis are much deeper than one particular country's dalliance in the banking sector or another's reliance on export markets. In fact, they lie at least in part in the concerted effort to free up credit for economic expansion across the world. In The New Paradigm for Financial Markets, George Soros traces the emergence of what he calls a 'super-bubble' in global financial markets to a series of economic policies to increase liquidity as a way of stimulating demand. Loosening restraints on the US Federal Reserve, de-regulating financial markets and promoting the securitization of debts through complex financial derivatives were also deliberate interventions. Their overriding aim was to promote economic growth.15 In short, what emerges from all this is that the market was not undone by isolated practices carried out by rogue individuals. Or even through the turning of a blind eye by less than vigilant regulators. The very policies put in place to stimulate growth in the economy led eventually to its downfall. The market was undone by growth itself.