Warming makes Chinese conflict inevitable

The poorest and least developed regions are the areas in which ethnic minorities live; these make up around 60 per cent of Chinese territory. These districts are dependent on agricultural yields and are therefore particularly affected by deforestation (Tibet, Yunnan, Sichuan), desertification (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia) and glacier melt (Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai). In the autonomous Uyghur region of Xinjiang, for example, scarce water and land resources are already the principal cause of disputes between different ethnic groups (Giese and Sehring, 2006). In addition, the Chinese government’s modernization policy for the autonomous regions based on economic development and resource extraction has bred political and ethnic conflict that continues to simmer (Heberer and Senz, 2006b). Social disparities among the population, increasing extraction of resources to underpin the economic upswing, and the effects of climate change threaten to further exacerbate these internal Chinese conflicts and beget the risk of growing political instability. In addition to the conflicts in the interior of the country, the regional security situation is becoming increasingly tense. Tensions are growing as a result of migration from China to neighbouring countries such as Russia and Mongolia, and as a consequence of the resource and raw materials policy pursued by China and by Chinese companies in adjoining states (e.g. Mongolia, Russia, Central Asia) (Barkmann 2006; Sidikov 2006; Umbach 2006). China’s need for resources also forms the background to territorial disputes over the islands of the South China Sea and disagreements between China and Japan (Heberer and Senz, 2006a). In addition, there is significant crisis potential in China’s relationship with Taiwan. The pursuit of national interests in dealings with neighbouring countries can, in the long term, serve to exacerbate conflict. This effect is heightened if the ‘nationalist card’ is perhaps played in an attempt to stabilize the state and maintain the Communist Party’s power (Klenke, 2006). A central challenge to China’s problem-solving capacity lies in the need to tackle not only social problems but also the environmental consequences of economic growth. The loss of arable land, the decline in soil quality and pollution of air and water are already giving rise to costs amounting to around 8 per cent of GDP (Economy, 2004). Every year millions of people fall victim to natural disasters; many of these are dependent on state aid. The health consequences of environmental pollution (e.g. ‘cancer villages’) are serious, and the number of protests is growing. The Chinese government has so far succeeded in presenting itself as capable of solving these problems. In fact, its position and legitimacy is built on its promise to develop and modernize the country, to solve the pressing social and ecological problems and to ensure political and social stability (Heberer and Senz, 2006b). The government’s goals and options for action in the face of these challenges are ambivalent; Chinese politics has broken away from Marxist-Leninist ideology and is based on pragmatism. The new innovative and technocratic political elite continues to focus primarily on economic development. The Chinese leadership, however, is to an increasing extent including ecological goals among its aims, particularly through the environmental authority SEPA. It has started to measure ‘green GDP’, for example, and has introduced measures to increase energy efficiency and expand renewable energies (SEPA, 2006; Schumann, 2007; Richerzhagen, 2007). The ‘Communist party state’ of the People’s Republic of China is not a homogenous structure but represents a system of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992). Within this system, a range of stakeholders exert influence on political decisions and their implementation – central government, the provinces, local government, the military, new social strata, new social organizations, etc. In many respects, the goals of central and local government conflict. For example, the implementation of environmental legislation often founders in the hands of administrative bodies at the lower level that evade the regu lations in the interests of local economic development (Lan et al., 2006; OECD, 2007a). Awareness of regional and global responsibility for environmental issues appears to be slowly growing (Wenk, 2007; Schumann, 2007). Negotiation and less coercion are now important tools of political consensus building and decisionmaking within China. A civil society movement is slowly emerging and giving rise to China’s own environmental NGOs. On account of the prevailing political structures, however, they are still fragmented, often locally oriented and not entirely independent of the government in the western sense. Provided that they do not pursue explicitly political goals, the state supports such organizations because they often contribute to solving concrete social problems. Overall, though, the party state is set against a splintered and weak civil society that is at present unable to challenge it effectively. 7.7.3 Conclusions The major environmental changes to be expected in China as a result of climate change are increasing soil degradation and the loss of arable land, an increase in extreme weather events and periods of drought and increasing water scarcity. The effects will, however, vary in different parts of China. Nevertheless, existing ecological and social problems in the cities and rural areas could escalate, undermining the dynamism of the economy and ultimately affecting the political stability of the country. The south will be confronted with an increase in flood disasters, severe weather events, storms and landslides. The main problems in the north will be water scarcity in summer and an increase in droughts – with subsequent harvest failures – as a result of glacier melt and precipitation variability. The rural population will bear the brunt of climate impacts. Compounded by ethnic tensions, poverty and social disadvantage, these regional developments could have a destabilizing effect on the entire country and on neighbouring states. Since rural exodus as a result of environmental degradation is already being observed, it is very likely that internal migration will increase further and will represent one of the central challenges of the coming decades (Heberer and Senz, 2006b). Further significant risk and conflict potential arises from the concentration of the economic infrastructure in the densely populated river deltas of the east coast. The rising sea level and an increase in flood disasters, possibly also driven by more powerful typhoons, could cause major damage both to industrial facilities – thus striking at the heart of the Chinese economy – and to residential areas in which millions of people live. The potential for conflict would be considerable. The anticipated problems present a major challenge to the political structures and the legitimacy of the Chinese government both internally and externally. Externally China, with its growing economic strength and global political weight, is not only becoming a serious competitor of the United States but is also being seen increasingly as a key player in matters of international climate policy. Tough international disputes are emerging over responsibility for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; such disagreements put the international system under pressure and can lead to tension in foreign policy matters. At home, the Chinese leadership runs the risk of being overstretched by the combined effects of heightened environmental problems, social polarization and economic and political liberalization. The political elite has recognized this problem and begun to develop mechanisms to protect against and deal with environmental problems and climate impacts. However, the government’s capacity to control and manage the situation has struggled to keep pace with modernization and the dynamism of economic growth (Richerzhagen, 2007). As regards preventing internal conflicts from escalating into violence, much will depend in future on whether the current balance between economic capability, the state’s ability to govern, and social acceptance or the ‘willingness to suffer’ of parts of the population continues to prevail (Heberer and Senz, 2006b). The ability to adapt to the anticipated climate impacts could thus be a crucial factor in China’s further development.