China is going to invade Taiwan now

China’s preparatory efforts to invade Taiwan are accelerating. The exercise for attacks on Taiwan, termed Joint Sword 2024A, is significant for the following reasons. First, the naming convention suggests there will be follow-on exercises such as Joint Sword 2024 B and C, which corresponds to the three elements of the Chinese military’s doctrine for an invasion of Taiwan, the Joint Fire Strike Campaign, or JFSC, Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign, or JAARC, and the Joint Island Landing Campaign, known as JILC. The idea of follow-on exercises was also suggested by a Global Times commentator on May 23 to include a fourth, part D. This means that the pace of exercises is quickening in order to mask Beijing’s intentions and preparations for war. Second, unlike the previous Joint Sword in April 2023, which was four days in duration, 2024A is just two days, an indicator that the Central Military Commission and People’s Liberation Army are honing their skills and sharpening their command and control to bring all their power to bear in a shorter, more concentrated time frame. In essence, fulfilling this iteration of exercises will fulfill their stated goal of being able to conduct a “short, sharp war.” That matters, because if China believes it can win quickly and decisively, then the ability of Taiwan and partners like the United States to deter such an attack is weakened. In addition, the naming of specific training objectives and elements such as “joint sea-air combat-readiness patrol, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision strikes on key targets” adds credence to the thesis of the “short, sharp war” objective for the Chinese Communist Party and Central Military Commission. Third, and most obvious, the closure areas are much closer to Taiwan than they were in Joint Sword 2023 or even the August 2022 missile firing exercise. This time the Joint Sword 2024A closure areas are within Taiwan’s contiguous zones — 24 nautical miles. In addition, the Chinese coast guard was noted on May 23 sailing within the territorial waters of Taiwan’s offshore islands of Wuqui and Dongyin — as close as 2.8 nautical miles. By doing this, China is testing to see just how close to Taiwan it will be able to operate before generating a kinetic response from Taiwan, Japan or the U.S. This is invaluable information to obtain and will provide Beijing a great advantage if and when they decide to conduct an invasion. Fourth, the joint nature of these operations is notable. With the reports of Chinese Strategic Rocket Force missile batteries being out of garrison and conducting “mock fire strike” launches, the main emphasis of this two-day Joint Force-2024A is on “joint precision strikes on key targets,’’ again, what the Chinese military doctrinally calls the Joint Fire Strike Campaign. This was occurring while the other services (army, navy and air force) were engaged in “joint sea-air combat readiness patrols” and “joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control.”