---- Product Hopping – Large companies pair evergreening with product hops to maintain a monopoly on newer versions of drugs

“Product Hopping” Definition Critics of current pharmaceutical patenting practices have observed that patent evergreening can be used in conjunction with a practice they call “product hopping.”432 Product hopping is the process by which a brand, as the patents on an older branded drug are expiring, uses its current dominant market position to switch doctors, pharmacists, and consumers to a newer version of the same (or similar) drug with later-expiring patents. In other words, the brand forces a “hop” from one product to another.433 The new version of the product may be, for example, an extended release form or new dosage (e.g., moving from twice-a-day to once-a-day), a different route of administration (e.g., moving from capsules to tablets, or tablets to film strips), or a chemical change (e.g., moving to a different enantiomer).434 The switch to the new version may be accompanied by a marketing campaign or discounts and rebates to encourage doctors, insurers, and patients to switch to the new version; in some cases, production of the older version may be discontinued.435 Product hopping tends to take one of two forms: a “hard switch,” where the brand removes the original product from the market, and a “soft switch,” where the brand leaves the original product on the market alongside the new form. 436 The case of Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.437 provides one example of a hard switch. That case involved Abbott’s changes to its drug TriCor, which was used to treat high cholesterol and triglycerides.438 Abbott allegedly lowered the drug’s strength, switched it from a capsule to a tablet, stopped selling capsules, bought back supplies of capsules from pharmacies, and marked capsules as “obsolete” in the national drug database.439 Once generics developed equivalents for the reformulation, Abbott allegedly again lowered the drug’s strength, stopped selling the original tablets, and again changed the code for the old tablets to “obsolete.”440 A soft switch allegedly occurred in Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC. 441 There, Actavis produced Namenda IR (IR), a twice-daily drug designed to treat Alzheimer’s disease.442 As the patents on IR neared expiration and generics prepared to enter the market, Actavis introduced a once-daily version of the drug, Namenda XR (XR), and allegedly attempted to encourage doctors and patients to switch from IR to XR.443 Although the generic versions would have been substitutable for IR, the differences in dosing (10 mg in IR and 28 mg in XR) meant the generic versions would not be substitutable for the new XR product.444 Initially, both IR and XR were on the market together.445 During that time, Actavis allegedly stopped marketing IR and “spent substantial sums of money promoting XR to doctors, caregivers, patients, and pharmacists.”446 Actavis also sold XR at a discount, making it much less expensive than IR, and issued rebates to ensure patients did not have to pay higher copayments for XR than IR.447 When it appeared the soft switch would only convert 30% of IR users to XR, Actavis allegedly implemented a hard switch by announcing it would discontinue IR and attempting to stop Medicare health plans from covering IR.448