The courts are politicized now and their decisions impact public perceptions

Ironically, it is Trump who has sought to politicize the judiciary, with strong support from Senate Republican leadership, who have pushed through far-right nominees—despite often strenuous objection from the civil rights and legal communities. He has referred to his judicial appointees as “my judges” and pledged during the 2016 campaign that they would rule along a far-right ideological line. True to his word, Trump has put increasing numbers of his own former political aides on the bench. Many of these aides-turned-judges went straight from Trump’s White House to the bench: For example, Gregory Katsas, who advised Trump on some of the administration’s cruelest anti-LGBTQ policies, and Steven Menashi, who worked with Stephen Miller as the administration carried out anti-immigration policies that have left children dead in U.S. facilities and turned away individuals in need of help at America’s borders, both serve as U.S. circuit court judges. And Neomi Rao, another former aide now on the bench, wrote an opinion arguing that Trump should be able to avoid virtually any congressional oversight, voicing a legal theory that legal experts say could invoke a “constitutional crisis.” Underscoring just how intent Trump and his allies are on bending the judiciary to their own ends, less than an hour after the Senate voted to acquit President Trump, allowing him to avoid consequences for bribing another country to interfere in the 2020 elections, they were moving forward yet another of Trump’s judicial nominees: Andrew Brasher, who managed criminal justice policy for the president as part of his 2016 transition team.

Congress and the public react to judicial decisions

Canon and Johnson- Professors of political science, 1999 p. 116-117

(Bradley Canon- professor of political science at the University of Kentucky and Charles Johnson- dept. head of political science at Texas A&M, judicial policies: implementation and impact)

More than any other public agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial policies. As a political body, Congress cannot ignore any sizable or prominent group of constituents. Some groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision or doctrine, and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress. If the pressure is great enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, Congress will, if feasible, take action. At the very least, numerous members of Congress will score political points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups. Clashes between Congress and the courts are virtually as old as the two branches. Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a political finesse of a hostile Congress by the Supreme Court. Constitutional crises have been provoked by such decisions as Dred Scott (Scott v Sandford, 1857) and several anti-New Deal decisions in the 1930s. Strained relationships just short of crises have developed from numerous other decisions. Of course, not all differences between the courts and Congress are emotionally charged. Many of the differences arise over mundane issues such as pension or admiralty law. Either way, almost every year, Congress reacts to judicial decisions.