The inclusion of “significance” specifically matters and should be accorded with a particular meaning. In caselaw, it establishes a heightened bar that acts as a term of art.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” 30 F. 4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at 4, and 4–5, n. 1. “Discriminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e.g., Bostock, 590 U. S., at 657–658, 681. But neither that phrase nor any other says anything about how much worse. There is nothing in the provision to distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant ones. And there is nothing to otherwise establish an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to add words—and significant words, as it were—to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands something more of her than the law as written. And that difference can make a real difference for complaining transferees. Many forced transfers leave workers worse off respecting employment terms or conditions. (After all, a transfer is not usually forced when it leaves the employee better off.) But now add another question—whether the harm is significant. As appellate decisions reveal, the answers can lie in the eye of the beholder—and can disregard varied kinds of disadvantage. Take just a few examples from the caselaw. An engineering technician is assigned to work at a new job site—specifically, a 14-by-22- foot wind tunnel; a court rules that the transfer does not have a “significant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin, 178 F. 3d 253, 256 (CA4 1999). A shipping worker is required to take a position involving only nighttime work; a court decides that the assignment does not “constitute a significant change in employment.” Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F. 3d 620, 635 (CA10 2012). And a school principal is forced into a non-school-based administrative role supervising fewer employees; a court again finds the change in job duties not “significant.” Cole v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 834 Fed. Appx. 820, 821 (CA4 2021) (per curiam). All those employees suffered some injury in employment terms or conditions (allegedly because of race or sex). Their claims were rejected solely because courts rewrote Title VII, compelling workers to make a showing that the statutory text does not require.2