Chevron never applied to issues of economic and political significance. The aff will get resolved the same way as it would before. Also, most statutes would never be considered vague in the first place making the Chevron doctrine irrelevant

Under Loper, judges "must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions." Loper, 603 US __ at *16. Loper states that "courts [should] use every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute and resolve the [statutory] ambiguity." Id. at *23. However, in many ways the framework courts use to analyze statutes will not change. As explained above, under Chevron, "step zero" requires the court to decide whether a statute is ambiguous. If the statute is not ambiguous, then the court should apply the plain meaning of the statute. Arguably when a statute is "clear and unambiguous" a court using "every tool at their disposal to determine the best reading of the statute" should reach the same result under Loper as it did under Chevron, because even under Chevron, agency interpretations of an unambiguous statute get no deference. As one example, in Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, the Federal Circuit considered the PTAB's interpretation of 35 USC. § 315(c). 973 F.3d 1321, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In Facebook, Petitioner Facebook filed a petition for IPR for each of four asserted patents. Id. at 1328. After Facebook's IPRs were on file, Patent Owner Windy City asserted additional claims in a parallel district court case. Id. Some of these new claims "were claims that Facebook had not challenged in its petitions for IPR." Id. Subsequently Facebook prepared two additional petitions for IPR challenging these additional asserted claims. Id. However, "[b]ecause the petitions would otherwise have been time-barred under 35 USC. § 315(b)," Facebook filed the new petitions along with motions asking the Board to join each new proceeding to the already-instituted IPR on the same patent under § 315(c). Id. The question therefore arose whether 315(c) allowed "same-party joinder"—i.e., whether Facebook could join an earlier Petition filed by Facebook under 315(c). Id. The Board instituted Facebook's new petitions and granted Facebook's motions for joinder. Id. In particular, the Board found that Facebook "ha[d] established good cause for joining this proceeding with the [existing] IPR." Id. In a concurring opinion, two Administrative Patent Judges ("APJs") stated that "§ 315(c), when properly interpreted, does not authorize same-party joinder" but that "the Director repeatedly has taken the position ... that such same-party joinder is permitted by § 315(c)" and the concurring APJs agreed to follow that position in this case, "[d]espite [their] disagreement with the Director's interpretation." Id. The Board's Precedential Opinion Panel also analyzed this issue in Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Technologies, LLC, No. IPR2018-00914, Paper 38, 2019 WL 1283948 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019), and concluded that "315(c) permits a petitioner to be joined to a proceeding in which it is already a party." Id. at 1335. In Facebook, the USPTO director also argued that Chevron deference should apply to at least POP decisions. However, on appeal the Federal Circuit explained that "§ 315(c) does not authorize same-party joinder, and also does not authorize joinder of new issues." Id. at 1338. To reach this conclusion the Federal Circuit relied on "traditional tools of statutory interpretation." Id. In particular, the Court explained that "the clear and unambiguous language of § 315(c) does not authorize same-party joinder" and, therefore, "we need not defer to the PTO's interpretation of § 315(c)." Id. The Facebook decision, therefore, represents one way a Court's analysis of statutes will not change in light of the Loper decision. Where a statute was found to be "clear and unambiguous" Chevron did not afford any deference to the agency interpretation. This will arguably stay the same under Loper. Likewise, as noted in the Loper decision, "Chevron does not apply if the question at issue is one of 'deep economic and political significance.'" Loper, 603 US __ at *27. Therefore, the Loper decision should have less of an impact on these questions of "deep economic and political significance."