Military AI integration strengthens deterrence and prevents war

Traditionally, nuclear deterrence relies on a country having credible nuclear capabilities plus the political will or resolve to use them if necessary (and only if necessary), therefore persuading an adversary to not attack. Integrating AI into nuclear systems can enhance nuclear decision-making, improving perceptions of both capability and resolve.

Early Warning and Detection: Avoiding Unnecessary Use and Escalation

Most significantly, integrating AI into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and using AI as part of the analytical tool kit for early warning and detection could improve target identification, prevent false positives or close calls, and increase understanding of adversary actions. AI can be used to increase a nation’s ability to understand the nature of its environment as well as speed of analysis and development of courses of action in a conflict, thus improving its overall capabilities in the nuclear space and reducing the risk of unintended escalation in the midst of a crisis with a nuclear dimension.

In a nuclear exchange, national leadership may have just minutes to assess a situation and determine whether to launch its own nuclear response. Nuclear weapons states such as the United States have sought to increase this decision-making time to reduce the potential for misunderstanding or miscalculation in a crisis, given the immense consequences of using nuclear weapons.21 Incorporating AI into early warning and decision-making analysis may improve both the speed and quality of information processing as well as eliminate potential biases from military leadership, which will be crucial in a crisis to allow time for de-escalation and tension reduction between sides.

Incorporating AI into early warning and decision-making could allow time for de-escalation

AI can similarly enhance the ability to discriminate between real and false information, which is critical to preventing miscalculation or mistake in a crisis. A number of “close calls” have occurred throughout the years, in which nuclear weapons use was only avoided through human intervention based on uncertain information.22 In 1983, NATO undertook Command Post Exercise Able Archer to “practice command and staff procedures, with particular emphasis on the transition from conventional to non-conventional operations, including the use of nuclear weapons.” 23 At the time, Soviet paranoia about a US nuclear first strike, with preparations under cover of a war game, was at an alltime high. When NATO began its Able Archer exercise, Soviet officials thought the exercise was real and put mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles Incorporating AI into early warning and decisionmaking could allow time for deescalation (ICBMs) on a three-minute alert.24 The same year, the Soviet early warning computer system signaled five incoming US Minuteman ICBMs. The watch officer on duty, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, did not report the incident, concluding that it must be a false alarm. If he had reported that US nuclear missiles were inbound, the Soviets would have followed their nuclear doctrine and retaliated with no time to double-check or negotiate with the United States.25 Petrov ultimately made the right call—as the Soviet early warning system had mistaken sun shining off clouds for incoming missiles.