Systematic review of 835 peer-reviewed articles and all empirical evidence concludes decoupling is bunk

Andrea Vetter, Matthias Schmelzer, Aaron Vansintjan, “The Future Is Degrowth”, Verso Books, Pages 82-83, 2022,

And while some temporary, localized absolute decoupling has taken place, in particular in some Global North countries with low growth rates, there is no evidence to show that it has, or can, occur at the scale needed to become permanent and global, nor to do so fast enough. For example, between 1980 and 2008, countries such as Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan decoupled their domestic material use from economic growth, and the G8 as a whole halved their domestic material consumption. Yet, when measured in absolute terms and including embedded resources in trade, material footprint closely tracks GDP in all wealthy nations, and, despite dips in GDP rates, continues to grow at an unsustainable rate.23 Furthermore, only fourteen countries have absolutely decoupled GDP growth from both production- and consumption-based CO2 emissions – and this was aided by slow economic growth and, for several, was only temporary. 24 Yet even in these countries, achieved mitigation rates remain very far from what is necessary to achieve climate targets, in particular if equity considerations are taken into account. To put the case directly: the transformations of the Global North economies necessary to achieve annual emissions reductions of around 10 per cent, as is necessary to avert a climate emergency, can only be achieved without economic growth and will most likely result in a reduction of GDP. 25

A recent systematic review of decoupling, synthesizing the evidence emerging from 835 peer-reviewed articles, concludes that while relative decoupling is common and while some small-scale and slow absolute decoupling can be seen in certain areas in recent years, the absolute decoupling we need is highly unlikely:

Large rapid absolute reductions of resource use and GHG emissions cannot be achieved through observed decoupling rates, hence decoupling needs to be complemented by sufficiency-oriented strategies and strict enforcement of absolute reduction targets.26

Another analysis of historical trends and model-based projections concludes:

(1) there is no empirical evidence that absolute decoupling from resource use can be achieved on a global scale against a background of continued economic growth, and (2) absolute decoupling from carbon emissions is highly unlikely to be achieved at a rate rapid enough to prevent global warming over 1.5°C or 2°C.27

Of course, this could theoretically change in the future – yet given what we know, this is highly unlikely, and the large-scale and high-speed energy transitions that would be necessary, including negative emission technologies, bear considerable risks regarding not only their feasibility, but also their sustainability and justice.28 Furthermore, next to the rebound effects discussed above that will compensate some of the efficiency gains, there are other mechanisms that make sufficiently fast absolute decoupling very unlikely – among these are the possibility of rising energy and resource expenditures, problem shifting to other regions and timescales, the impacts of services, the limited potential for recycling, lack of technological innovations, and cost shifting by polluting industries to society and nature.29