China is a revisionist and expansionist power—small scale territorial conflicts will increase

The evolving international order has mostly been divided into two categories of powers: status quo and revisionist. The latter, as the term signifies, are powers who aim to revise the existing global systems or order by altering it gradually or overthrowing it completely through new measures or initiatives. A gradual change would indicate the rise of an evolutionary revisionist power, while a sudden or rapid change indicates a revolutionary revisionist power. Essentially, a revisionist power aims to enhance its power, status and authority in global decision-making process, seeking to remodel the international system, and eventually the order, in its favor. A revolutionary revisionist power views such an endeavor through the lenses of realism. 13 Alternatively, an evolutionary revisionist power follows the idealist school of thought, or a gradualist path: it would not necessarily confront the established great powers in seeking to change the existing international systems and order. 14

Scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Suisheng Zhao, argue that rising powers such as China and India, with the potential to emerge as major (or great) powers, would continue to pose challenges for the existing international system and order. 15 The intensity to compete, perhaps to challenge the existing system or order, is more noticeable in China than in other powers, highlighting that China is more ‘revisionist’ than a normal ‘status quo’ power. 16 The reasons behind China’s perception as a revisionist power in Indo-Pacific are appositely clear. These include authoritarian and unilateral initiatives to bring out fast-track infrastructure development along with connectivity through the flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and assertive claims in the maritime domains, such as the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Further, mounting claims over land territories and attempts to create a distinct order through the creation of international institutions or forums that are evidently linked to China’s national interests are also important factors. 17 On account of this, the tag of revisionism on Beijing appears today to be justified. 18

Defining a status quo power is fairly simple: they are powers that are primarily content with the fundamental characteristics of the prevailing global order and power distribution. 19 Accepting globalization and international organizations by willingly participating or being a part of them is a key trait of a status quo power. Despite the reservations that it holds on a range of subjects pertaining to the established institutions or organizations, Beijing has been an active member, participant and beneficiary of the international liberal order or the Bretton Woods institutions and other existing international or regional multilateral organizations. Long has China reaped the benefits of the Bretton Woods institutions, even though it has always expressed its displeasure, stating that these institutions are not developing society friendly mannerisms and are primarily dominated by the Western influence. Equally, China established the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); has been an active partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); is a founding member of the United Nations (UN); and holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to enhance its international interest. 20

In contrast, a revisionist power is one that is dissatisfied with the global order and wants to change the existing norms that have been created by the status quo powers. As explained by political scientist Randall Schweller, a revisionist state wants to ‘undermine’ the existing order so as to increase its own power in the system. 21 In the case of China, an article by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the creation of ‘two China’s’ in the United Nations highlights the country’s dissatisfaction with the established order, and mainly the US. 22 Such dissatisfaction is no more a secret phenomenon in the Chinese public discourse. Most domestic debates in China are centered around the dialogue on how Beijing’s rise must bring revisions to the existing international systems or create new systems. Nevertheless, the emerging ‘great’ power does not seem to fall clearly under either category. It has recently started advocating for a far more active role in the UN; and since assuming a permanent seat in the UNSC in 1971, used its veto power only 14 times, the lowest of the permanent five. 23 At the same time, it has become an increasingly assertive regional power that has, since the launch of its BRI in 2013, factored greatly on the US watch as a ‘threat that is greater than terrorism’. 24

Revisionism also draws greatly from the power transition theory of international relations. 25 It was A.F.K. Organski who in his book World Politics first propagated the power transition theory while simultaneously predicting the possible rise of China and the effect it would have on international power politics. 26 Power transition theory has two major premises: (1) internal growth or development is the source of power for a country and (2) the existing international order during the time of another power’s ‘rise’ is shaped by a hegemon. 27 China’s economic growth in the past decade has been nothing short of a miracle; from a primarily agrarian economy, China has developed into an industrial dynamo, more importantly emerging as a donor country. 28 It is this very remarkable growth that has marked China, in the eyes of the US, as a revisionist power—in 2014, China overtook, although briefly, the US as the largest economy of the world, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). 29

It is important to note that efforts by the reigning dominant power to allay the concerns of the challenging powers can lower the possibility of a power transition conflict. However, that did not happen in the case of the US vis-à-vis China. The election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 marked a major turning point in the US approach towards China. 30 Unlike the previous US administration, Trump’s hostility to Chinese advances, from bilateral to regional dealings, has been vocal, direct and critical. 31 Fortunately, until the time China’s military strength is able to match that of the US, major war between the two competing powers in not really foreseen. As Schweller argues, a key characteristic of a revisionist power is that it will ‘employ military force’ in order to disrupt the status quo; this has not been the case with China in respect to the US. 32 While Chinese military assertiveness in the South China Sea and within its own borders has been open, it has not engaged in a military conflict with the US, the dominant power. The trade war between the US and China, however, represented a geo-economic conflict between both the powers. The trade war intensified in 2019, although the finalizing of a ‘phase one’ deal at the beginning of 2020 marks an optimistic sign. 33 The inking of the deal allayed fears that the US–China relations were deteriorating faster than they could be mended.