U.S. competitiveness doesn’t matter for dampening conflict

Christopher J. Fettweis, an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Chapter 1: Unipolarity and the System,” Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press, 2018, accessed through Georgetown Libraries

If either version is correct—that global stability is provided by U.S. hegemony—then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly wise.80 If, however, U.S. actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States could retrench without fear of negative consequences.

The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to theories of hegemonic stability. And, once again, there is no evidence that U.S. choices matter much. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post–Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. As it happens, each administration is a reasonable representation of one the four ideal types of grand strategy laid out by Posen and Ross in 1996.81 Under George H.W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-ofpower realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neoisolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.”82 In the lingo of political science, we have substantial variation in the independent variable, more than enough to determine its effect on the phenomenon under consideration. The result is clear (see table 1.1).

Armed-conflict levels fell steadily throughout the post–Cold War era, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose. Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while U.S. behavior became more restrained. Once again, if the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence.

If a correlation did exist between U.S. actions and international stability, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in U.S. military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic-stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.83 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such it deserves a different kind of examination.