That’s the consensus view of literature.

A number of studies have shown that Congress considers current levels of presidential approval when passing legislation (Brady and Volden 1998; Cohen et al. 2000; Edwards 1980, 1989). Early studies were able to find correlations between approval ratings and success in Congress (see, e.g., Edwards 1980; Ostrom and Simon 1985). However, later research depicts the relationship between approval ratings and legislative success as more conditional (Canes-Wrone and De Marchi 2002; Edwards 1989). Supporting a piece of legislation championed by an unpopular president could ultimately result in negative consequences for members of Congress. If presidents propose legislation to Congress that is salient with the mass electorate and has higher levels of approval, however, then members stand to gain from supporting the president.9

On a similar note, the honeymoon period of a president’s initial time in office has been shown to increase the likelihood of legislative success (Beckmann and Godfrey 2007; Brace and Hinckley 1991; Farnsworth and Lichter 2011; McCarty 1997). Presidents lose their favorability with the public and with Congress the longer that they are in office (McCarty 1997), which is why they often push for significant legislative accomplishments early in their term. Members of Congress are uniquely aware of the public’s sentiments after a presidential election, especially because they share a common constituency with the president and are more likely to capitulate to a president’s agenda.10 Therefore, a president should receive more cooperation from members of Congress for their legislative agenda items earlier in his term.

We should also expect the president to have varying levels of success depending on the policy in question (Ragsdale 2014). One area where the president is more likely to succeed in Congress is in foreign policy. The amount of knowledge the president possesses in matters of foreign policy, compared to members of Congress, is usually much greater (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008; Wildavsky 1966). This information asymmetry in foreign policy leads Congress to be relatively deferential to the president’s proposals, therefore often negating their need to act unilaterally in order to achieve the president policy goals (Marshall and Pacelle 2005).11 Furthermore, members of Congress often have little incentive to get involved in foreign policy as there is little or no direct electoral return for them (Mayhew 1974).12

A president’s ability to pursue policies with Congress is also affected by institutional features such as unified government, polarization, filibuster or veto pivots, and the partisan composition of the chambers (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Howell 2005; Krehbiel 1998; Mayhew 2011). Much of the previous work on presidential success in Congress has focused on the distinction between unified versus divided government and has found that presidents are more likely to shift policy when there is unified government, which makes intuitive sense (Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Mayhew 2011). If the same party controls the presidency and both chambers of Congress, then it is reasonable to assume that a majority of the legislation that is proposed by the president will at least make it onto the legislative agenda. It also follows that during times of divided government, the president would have a harder time getting legislation passed through Congress as a result of more divergent policy preferences, which therefore impedes their ability to form the necessary coalition needed to move the status quo (Mayhew 2005; Ragusa 2010).13 The effect of divided government is likely to be exacerbated with greater polarization as well. As the parties’ ideologies diverge, fewer opportunities exist for bipartisan compromise on issues, therefore potentially hampering the president’s ability to move policy.

Beyond simple majority status, the actual size of the president’s party within Congress also matters. Prior research demonstrates that the size of the coalition that the president has within Congress affects the likelihood that policy change is enacted (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Deering and Maltzman 1999). A bare majority is insufficient unless there is no diversity among members’ ideologies, and even substantial majorities may not suffice if one faction holds substantially different policy preferences from the rest of the party (such as the Southern Democrats during the 1950s and 1960s). Therefore, simple majority status is not sufficient for understanding policy changes. Instead, one must consider the size of the president’s coalition and its ideological homogeneity as well (Rohde 1991). Increasing the size of the coalition the president has in Congress should result in an easier path in passing legislation.14 This should be especially true during times of distinctly different ideological preferences between the majority and minority parties.

A variety of factors could influence the success of a president’s legislative proposal in Congress. Based on the president’s proclivity to have legislative proposals realized through law, the previous factors will influence the success or failure of a president’s ability to have proposals make it through Congress. Although presidents may not witness a specific proposal become law, this does not mean their initiatives will necessarily remain unrealized. Allowing an issue to remain at its status quo is indeed an option; however, the president may also decide (or be forced) to move policy unilaterally.15 There are a multitude of reasons that a legislative proposal would receive no action by Congress or the president. At times it is unclear why no action is initially taken in Congress, because it is difficult to ascertain a legislator's motivations in not pursuing a particular course of action. In addition, the use of the Hastert Rule in the House and the filibuster in the Senate could result in no action taken on specific policy proposals. Gridlock is an issue that must be addressed before legislation moves out of either chamber, which would stall progress and result in no action taken by the legislative body. Unpopular presidents usually struggle to have their legislative proposals acted on by Congress (Canes-Wrone and De Marchi 2002); based on the fact that the public does not support the president, Congress will decide not to act. When dealing with legislative proposals, there are two specific endings—either the status quo is changed (i.e., Congress or the president creates a policy shift) or the status quo remains the same and the proposal receives no action.