Trade secrets could lead to dangerous scenarios such as poisonous chemicals – leads deaths, empirics prove

Trade secrecy can cause harm. First, trade secrecy does not always promote one of its stated policy goals—innovation.42 Rather, it encourages companies to engage in duplicative investment in research and development.43 It also frustrates the disclosure goals of the patent system when companies opt for trade secrecy rather than patent protection. Second, secrecy debilitates judgment.45 If only a select few know the trade secret, then they are the only ones who can make decisions regarding the information at issue. This postpones discovery of errors and effectively shuts out criticism from others who may be able to provide valuable feedback.46 As a result, faulty assumptions about risk may mean that little to no deliberation takes place regarding whether to continue, modify, or cease use of the trade secret.47 Third, secrecy has the capacity to corrupt and to invite abuse.48 Due to others’ lack of knowledge regarding the trade secret, those with knowledge operate in a system free from oversight.49 This lack of accountability coupled with the desire for higher profits (for which they are held accountable) results in a loosening of moral constraints.50 When no one is present to hold a mirror up to their faces, they can downplay the consequences of their actions and disregard any negative impacts the trade secret may have on their employees, their consumers, the general public, or the environment. Corporations assert trade secrecy for a number of reasons,51 some of which are improper. For decades, companies have been introducing new products, such as cigarettes,52 asbestos fibers,53 pesticides (namely, DBCP),54 and lead paint55 into the market. The public later discovered that these products were dangerous. For decades, however, companies used trade secrecy to conceal the dangerous aspects of their products.56 The following examples—perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), vinyl chloride, and benzene—merely scratch the surface of companies’ use of trade secrets to hide known health dangers from the public.57 In 1951, the chemical company DuPont began purchasing PFOA, a man-made biopersistent and bioaccumulative chemical, from the 3M Company to aid in its manufacture of Teflon, a nonstick coating applied to skillets and pans.58 In addition to cookware, PFOA was ultimately used in hundreds of other products, including food containers, clothing, and carpet.59 By 1961, through self-funded, secret medical studies, DuPont became aware that PFOA was dangerous,60 yet the company remained silent.61 Meanwhile, employees regularly contracted “Teflon flu”—exemplified by “fever, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting—after working in one of the PFOA storage tanks.”62 Employees were instructed not to bring their work clothes home anymore.63 3M also reported several concerns to DuPont. In 1978, 3M told DuPont that PFOA had been detected in the blood of workers at a plant that manufactured the chemical.64 In 1981, 3M reported that PFOA caused birth defects in rats.65 Thereafter, DuPont learned that two of its seven pregnant female employees gave birth to children with facial deformities.66 Despite these health concerns and 3M’s recommendations for how to properly dispose of PFOA—through incineration or disposal at chemical waste facilities—DuPont discharged “hundreds of thousands of pounds of PFOA powder” into the Ohio River and stored “7,100 tons of PFOA-laced sludge” in its facility’s digestion ponds, “open, unlined pits . . . from which the chemical could seep into the ground.”67 As a result, PFOA entered the drinking water supply of over one hundred thousand people.68 By 1984, DuPont knew that drinking water across the Ohio River was contaminated.69 However, the health risks were outweighed by the monetary rewards. An internal document dated later in 1984 stated that while the “[l]egal and medical [departments] will likely take the position of total elimination,” the company executives concluded that cutting pollution was “not ‘economically attractive.’”70 Therefore, rather than reducing its use of PFOA, DuPont increased production.71 It also continued to keep the dangers related to PFOA exposure secret.72 Additional studies echoed earlier warnings, yet DuPont continued to put its profit before public welfare. In 1990, a study showed that 3M employees with long-term exposure to PFOA had higher rates of death from prostate cancer than employees who were not exposed. 73 Internal documentation indicated that “DuPont understood that PFOA caused cancerous testicular, pancreatic and liver tumors in lab animals.”74 Rather than developing a less toxic or less risky alternative, DuPont decided to continue using PFOA.75 As the New York Times noted, “[t]he risk was too great” given that PFOA products were “worth $1 billion in annual profit.”