Economic insecurity is a risk factor for populism.

The economic insecurity caused by task automation of routine-based work is often associated with increased political polarization across Europe and the United States. A large body of evidence now exists showing that a higher risk of automation leads to increased support for populist right-wing parties. Economic uncertainty explains up to one-third of the rise in extremism in Europe, with automation playing a subsidiary role alongside other factors impacting economic livelihoods.

First, how much technology-enabled automation is occurring? And what are its economic effects? Seminal research by scholars such asd David Autor, Claudia Goldin, Lawrence Katz, and David Dorn shows that since the 1980s, the United States has experienced distinct inequalities in the employment distribution, with rising shares of high-wage and low-wage work but a stagnant middle. The effects of digitalization—the diffusion of digital technology in the economy—have played a significant role in this rise of wage inequality in the U.S. Meanwhile, evidence from Kurer and Callego (2019) shows that the decrease in routine-based occupations in the U.K. is attributable to a lower intake of new workers, as most of the routine-based workers in their sample (64.5%) remain in a routine-based profession during the duration of the study, and only 3.4% of them end up unemployed.

The nature of these effects can therefore appear covert, even to workers themselves. Much of the public may attribute automation-related job displacement or skill-devaluing to other factors, such as immigration. Indeed, research by Dani Rodrik (2021) shows that cultural divergence and globalization across countries have played a significant role in growing polarization and populism. Yet he also notes that “both technology and demand shocks elicit a protectionist response…” When automation exposure is increased and perceived by workers, it can lead to calls for a slowdown of automation. Despite this, many social scientists suggest that the effects of automation on polarization are chiefly due to the threat of displacement, rather than workers’ experience of losing their job. Kurer (2020) provides evidence of this in Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. He shows that workers who lost or left their routine jobs supported left-wing parties but were between six percent and 15% more likely to abstain from the political process, reflecting disenchantment. “Survivors” of automation who maintained their jobs were more likely to vote for the populist right. This is in line with other more recent evidence suggesting that automation exposure can reduce political engagement for lower-pay workers unless they are situated in a highly unionized environment.

What should we make of the increase in polarization between automation “survivors” and those who leave their jobs? Some scholars have suggested that the observed increase in the vote share of the populist right in Europe is attributable to the fear of losing one’s social status. Kurer (2020), Im et al (2022), and Boewein et al (2024) all offer evidence that automation does indeed induce growth in voting for the populist right. The argument that automation damages workers’ perception of social status is supported by other scholarship too. Van Overbecke (2024) observes a moderating effect of wage, business policy, and contract stability—all factors linked to social status—on the relationship between automation and political polarization. Anelli et al (2021) show that the loss of social status alone doesn’t explain the effects of automation on political behavior—the broader loss of economic standing itself has a role in generating movement toward the right.