Even if formal global cooperation stalls, the US is working bilaterally to ensure pathogen access for pandemic response

HPW: One of the biggest points of contention in the pandemic agreement negotiations is pathogen access and benefit sharing, governing how World Health Organization (WHO) member states share the biological material of pathogens that may cause pandemics. How has the US addressed this in its global health security strategy?

Psaki: This goes back to the point that every experience is not going to be exactly like the COVID pandemic. But if we think for example, about some of the other outbreaks that I mentioned before, Ebola, in particular, we’ve had very, very few Ebola cases in the US. It is not a major threat to the United States. And so when we are thinking about how to respond to Ebola and how to ensure that countermeasures are developed and available, to date, it has largely been to ensure that those countermeasures are available to people living in the countries where the outbreak is emerging.

We have had a really forward leaning approach, not just in this Administration, but historically from the United States to make sure that vaccines, therapeutics and countermeasures are available when there is an outbreak based on a pathogen with pandemic potential. But also other disease outbreaks with existing vaccines, thinking about cholera, dengue, and other outbreaks around the world.

We are by far the leading donor to respond to these outbreaks, most of which don’t have a direct impact on Americans. So when we talk about the importance of access to samples and the data early on in an outbreak, that is the quickest way to make sure that medical countermeasures are developed and available, not just to Americans but to the rest of the world. The only impact of constraining access to pathogens and data will allow the pathogen to spread more widely, and delay access to countermeasures. I would pose it the other way: what is the upside to holding back access to pathogens?