Chinese o-crime corrupts the BRI.

A potential side effect of Chinese infrastructure projects and the associated influx of Chinese workers and subsequent establishment of communities relates to the typical trafficking mechanisms employed by Chinese criminal networks. These rely on the cultural practice of guanxi (defined as ‘the basic dynamic in Chinese personalized networks of influence and refers to favours gained from social connections’)78 and high levels of social control and trust derived from ethnic kinship and family ties.79 These criminals also tend to be involved in, and control, the entire supply chain from source to distribution into the Chinese market. This introduces the risk that criminals might penetrate Chinese communities established in BRI-linked countries and leverage social ties to engage, or coerce, fellow Chinese nationals into illicit activities. A wildlife trader in Kunming (China) shared the following insight during an interview with researchers Daan van Uhm and Rebecca Wong:

Pangolin hunters in Myanmar and Indonesia, rhino poachers in South Africa or hunters of saiga antelopes in Kazakhstan and Mongolia all have contacts with the Chinese in those areas. Usually those ethnic Chinese persons own small shops as a cover for their illegal business. They deliver their valuable wildlife products and are paid by Chinese middlemen who have connections to my people.80

Other studies have highlighted the large number of ethnic Chinese nationals involved in the trade of pangolin scales, bear bile and tiger bones in Mong La (Myanmar)81 and Chinese middlemen’s role in South Africa’s rhino horn trade.82 An examination of court cases tried in Beijing and elsewhere in China between 2017 and 2019 implicates Chinese nationals living in countries such as Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and even Italy in trafficking illicit wildlife into Chinese airports.83

The specific link between Chinese criminal networks and the BRI was highlighted by the US Treasury upon imposing sanctions on Wan Kuok-koi in December 2020. Wan, known as ‘Broken Tooth’, is described by American authorities as ‘a member of the Communist Party of China’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and is a leader of the 14K triad, one of the largest Chinese organized criminal organizations in the world that engages in drug trafficking, illegal gambling, racketeering, human trafficking, and a range of other criminal activities.’84 Through establishing a chapter of the World Hongmen History and Culture Association (a Chinese fraternal organization that is synonymous with triads) in Cambodia, he tried to legitimize the 14K triad, co-opting individuals in Cambodia and Malaysia and building a facade of legitimacy by claiming association with BRI projects. According to the US Treasury, this fits a well-established pattern of Chinese criminal organizations that have in common involvement in casinos and cryptocurrencies and claim connections to the Chinese government.85 This is also the case with an internationally known narcotics trafficker, Zhao Wei, who is closely linked to the development of the Kings Romans Casino in the Golden Triangle SEZ in the northwest of Lao PDR. Zhao, who is also sanctioned by the US Treasury, is believed to run an international criminal network active in drugs, prostitution and illicit wildlife trade from here.86 23

However, it would be wrong to blankly criminalize Chinese nationals living in BRI countries. It is the convergence of criminal actors, financial opportunities for traffickers, the social dynamics described earlier and a significant Chinese presence abroad (as of 2016, an estimated 2 million Chinese nationals were employed outside of China, 90% of them in BRI countries in Africa and Asia)87 that might be exploited for criminal purposes. Among these factors, the creation of SEZs at BRI infrastructure hubs, which simplifies the manufacture and movement of illicit goods, will likely be the greatest facilitator of illicit trade, and likely completely beyond the surveillance of the states in question.