They’ll disagree with the entire premise---content doesn’t matter.

The eighteen objections submitted make hardly any attempt to argue against what Bolivia has actually proposed. The U.S. objection merely states that the objective of the Single Convention is to limit the use of narcotic drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes and that Schedule I lists coca leaf as a narcotic drug. No further explanation is provided.

However, the implication – as spelled out in the objection by Latvia – is that because the purpose of Bolivia’s amendment is “to maintain a habit and socio-cultural practice, not a medical or scientific purpose,” coca leaf chewing still needs to be abolished. The UK, Canada, Denmark, Bulgaria, Russia and Japan all more or less copied and pasted from the text of the U.S. objection, not adding any further explanation. These countries avoid addressing the inconsistency of a coca chewing ban with the 1988 Trafficking Convention, whereby all measures “shall take due account of traditional licit uses, where there is historic evidence of such use” (article 14) and with the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, key arguments brought forward by Bolivia.

Sweden, Germany, France and Italy, however, phrase their objections somewhat differently. Sweden says it understands the concerns of Bolivia about the conflict between the Convention and the traditional coca leaf chewing. However, Sweden maintains that “the Bolivian proposal poses the risk of creating a political precedent and might directly infringe on the international framework for the fight against drugs” that “would send a negative signal.” The ‘negative signal’ and ‘political precedent’ phrasing is also taken up by Italy, France and Estonia.

Germany recognizes “that the proposal touches upon complex development and health policy issues, in addition to the intricate drugs issues” and is aware of the particular importance of coca chewing “as part of the cultural identity of the indigenous population, the majority of all Bolivians”. Based foremost on “fundamental drug policy consideration” Germany cannot accept the amendment, but proposes further dialogue with Bolivia and “will give favourable consideration to the question of convening a conference of states to discuss the issue.”

Convening such a conference is precisely what most other objecting countries hope to avoid, as mentioned explicitly by Denmark, who “finds no reason for calling a conference to consider the amendments.” Both France and Italy do refer however to a ‘dialogue.’ France is “deeply committed” to the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and “is therefore open to dialogue aimed at arriving at a solution that would better accommodate the tradition of coca leaf chewing while maintaining the integrity of the Single Convention of 1961.”

Italy also “underlines the importance of respecting the cultural identity and traditions of indigenous populations, guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, Italy believes that the dialogue aimed at further promoting respect for indigenous traditions should be fully coherent with and preserve the integrity of the Single Convention.” Estonia underscores the importance of dialogue with Bolivia over their concern, “but it needs to be dealt with outside the framework of the 1961 Convention.”

Perhaps feeling the pressure from the media and thousands of coca-chewing protestors gathering in front of their embassy in La Paz at the end of January, the U.S. issued a clarifying statement. The U.S. “respects the culture of indigenous peoples and recognizes that coca chewing is a traditional custom in Bolivian culture” and the “position of the U.S. government to not support the proposed amendment is based on the importance to maintain the integrity of the 1961 Convention, which constitutes an important tool for the global fight against drug trafficking.”

There is a blatant contradiction in a line of reasoning that purports to uphold respect for indigenous rights while simultaneously rejecting the correction of an obvious violation of those rights embedded in the Single Convention. The importance of defending the “integrity” of the drug control treaty system essentially overrules indigenous rights, according to the objecting countries. Behind this position lies the fear that allowing Bolivia’s amendment to be adopted might open a Pandora’s Box. The Single Convention, in this view, must be regarded as sacrosanct, cast in stone, and allowing any changes would jeopardize the integrity of the control system. Mexico spelled it out in its objection, saying the country: “deems it inadvisable to initiate a process to amend the Single Convention of 1961.”19

It appears to be forgotten that only a decade after the adoption of the Single Convention, the U.S. itself proposed numerous amendments. “The United States believes it is now time for the international community to build on the foundation of the Single Convention, since a decade has given a better perspective of its strengths and weaknesses,” the U.S. argued at the time. The UK was the first to support the U.S. call to improve the Convention and to convene a Conference of the Parties to discuss the proposals, adding some amendment proposals themselves, which led to the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Convention. At the time, the U.S. did not “regard its proposals as sacrosanct; it welcomed suggestions for new improvements; it hoped also that other countries would come forward with their own proposals.”

The main objectors to Bolivia’s current proposal, arguing the need to protect the integrity of the treaty by not allowing any amendments, were precisely the countries who proposed the first amendments themselves, at which time they argued the need for the control system to develop and improve. Another disturbing element underlying several objections is that they are essentially saying to Bolivia: “We don’t really have a problem with coca chewing, but we prefer that you keep violating the Convention rather than try to change it according to the established procedures.” A more ‘negative signal’ regarding the integrity of the treaty system is difficult to imagine, coming from countries ostensibly protecting it.