Link Turn – The plan gets framed as a win for America
Amy Kapczynski, 2008, [Amy Kapczynski is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Faculty Co-Director of the Law and Political Economy Project, cofounder of the Law and Political Economy blog, and Faculty Co-Director of the Global Health Justice Partnership, “The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property” The Yale Law Journal, Volume 117, Issue 5, Retrieved from the University of Michigan Database, Accessed 7/27/24, S.A.M.]
Framing theory also suggests that the term facilitates alliances between these groups, and helps them appeal to a broader cohort of contiguous groups and bystanders. The frame builds a bridge between patent and copyright, perhaps permitting copyright industries to draft off of the arguments that the pharmaceutical industry makes about the importance of exclusive rights to innovation. Similarly, it may permit patent-based industries to benefit from arguments about piracy and the breakdown of law that copyright owners make. (Of course, each member of this newly framed group is also rendered vulnerable to the attacks made on their new allies.) The importance of collective-action frames for industry actors is particularly apparent in the international realm. The TRIPS agreement is widely attributed to the efforts of a very small number of industry leaders in the United States who came together to articulate a common interest and persuade the legislative and executive branches that IP protection was crucial to the balance of trade in the United States. 201 But as analysts of the process have shown, the alliance itself was not a foregone conclusion; industry groups had to create a new trade committee in order to create a common agenda that would unite Hollywood producers, publishing interests, the software sector, industrial manufacturers, and the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Participants initially understood themselves as “strange bedfellows” and had significant disagreements about strategy.203 Part of how they united and gained the support of policymakers was by forging a common identity as intellectual property industries, and by framing the use of their products without permission as “theft.”204 The industry lobby was “particularly effective in translating their private interests into a matter of public interest,” for example by “packag[ing] its demands as a solution to America’s trade woes” and “appeal[ing] to America’s long-standing free trade ethos.” 205 It made the case that TRIPS was not only good for American business, but also good for global innovation, and for developing countries specifically.206 Although there were undoubtedly many factors that worked to produce the acquiescence of developing countries,207 those who have studied it have concluded that the success of TRIPS required not just pressure and transfer payments, but also interventions in the realm of ideas.208