Promoting epistemic insecurity fuels far-right populism and is used to support Russian revisionism – that shields Putin’s regime from domestic revolution

This relationship between epistemic insecurity and acceptance of ‘alternative knowledges’ is of great interest to the Russian government. The weakening of scientific dominance in favour of a plurality closely mirrors Russian designs on liberal hegemony at the international level. The same applies to the incursion of conspiracy thinking into the ground previously occupied by rational liberal political debate. Again, to put this in post modern terms, once Russia has ‘exposed’ the dominant discourses of the West for what they are—lies and distortions—the (psychological) ground is clear for the rise of ‘alternative’ discourses, ‘alternative knowledges’, all of which are, at least in principle, equally valid.

One example of this tactic in action is RT’s penchant for anti-mainstream politicians, granting ‘extended coverage to party leaders and their views, as well as portraying key common enemies, such as the US and global capital, in a negative way’ (Grätz 2015: p. 43). Nigel Farage, for instance, the then leader of Britain’s Eurosceptic Ukip party, appeared on RT at least seventeen times between December 2010 and April 2014 (Wintour and Mason 31 March 2014). As Patrick Wintour and Rowena Mason at the Guardian note, ‘The Ukip leader has appeared so frequently that he is cited in literature for the TV station Russia Today as one of their special and “endlessly quotable” British guests. “He has been known far longer to the RT audience than most of the British electorate,” Russia Today claims’ (31 March 2014).

Populist parties like Mr. Farage’s Ukip are on the rise across Europe, and have earned their popularity in large part because of their status as outsiders, as alternatives to an unresponsive and overbearing ‘political elite’ (Panizza 2005: p. 9). RT supports this narrative in at least two ways. First it lends support to their case against mainstream politicians by presenting them as corrupt, manipulative and deceiving; and second it gives them and their views extensive positive coverage in their programing. These parties all represent political ‘alternatives’ and typically alternatives in line with Russia’s interests. As Grätz concludes,

For Putin, these new anti-mainstream parties represent a huge opening for his effort to undermine the EU. They are exactly the force that he needs for realizing his goals: they are mostly opposed to the US and NATO, while advocating stronger ties with Russia. In most cases, they also want to dismantle the EU, striving for a Europe of self-sufficient sovereign nation states instead of rules-based integration… [And even] if such parties do not come to power they will lead to a more cautious approach in the EU… as they will be a credible threat to existing elites. (2015 p. 42)

Strengthening the position and the plausibility of these alternatives within Europe has direct and obvious implications for Russia’s aspirations to global multipolarity, and applied postmodernism as I have described it provides Russia with just the set of tools it needs to do this.

But as I have said, Russia’s promotion of alternative perspectives is not limited to fringe political groups; through RT it also engages in the promotion of ‘subjugated knowledges’ in the form of conspiracy theories. In fact, these form a regular part of its coverage, especially on shows like The Truthseeker (Yablokov 2015: p. 306). On one episode of the show, for instance, its host claims that ‘investigation finds the FBI practically behind every so-called terrorist plot in the United States. Agents find someone poor enough to bribe and set up the plot for them from start to finish’ (quoted in Bruk 2014: p. 12). And, as Weiss and Pomerantsev report, one of RT’s Spanishlanguage programs recently ‘considered whether the US was behind the Ebola outbreak’, while ‘during the Syrian conflict… RT broadcast programs about an alleged massacre by rebel forces at Adra—a massacre that appears never to have taken place’ (2014: p. 16).

While RT often voices open support for conspiracy theories, as in the cases above, at other times it brings conspiracy theorists on as guests and lets them do the talking. One frequent guest, for example, is British ‘New World Order’ conspiracy theorist Peter Eyre. In one interview on the war in Syria, Eyre is introduced as a ‘middle east consultant’ before espousing his view that the whole war is ‘all a false charade’. ‘You’ve got to understand’ he says ‘that at the top of all this is a very strong Zionist implication, who control the politics of America, in the UK, and in Europe, and they’re actually playing the cards’ (NeedToAwaken 2011). All of this, of course, goes unchallenged.

While with the promotion of epistemic insecurity serves Russia’s ends in a negative sense, by undermining confidence in Western values and practices, the promotion of ‘alternative’ and ‘anti-hegemonic’ narratives serves its ends in a positive sense. It fills the new void with a plurality of competing narratives that give apparent alternatives to the explanations on offer in the Western press. As with the rise of alternative medicines, the rise of alternative explanations for political events is a predictable consequence of the loss of perceived authority among the Western media. Russia is seeking to fuel this fire by making itself a source of such explanations. Though many of the perspectives they offer are in the direct interest of the Putin regime, many are not. And this is because the primary aim is the establishment of a new thoroughly relativistic set of standards, not the promotion of any specific Russian position.

Applied Postmodernism: Summary

As I have said, Putin’s chief foreign policy preoccupation is the threat that it faces from information warfare with the West. Unfavourable coverage of its actions undermines its ability to act and to remain in power and liberal criticism threatens to stir the Russian masses into revolt against their system of power. The scepticism RT promotes and the alternative perspectives it gives voice to, however, have the potential to stem the flow of these attacks. By undermining people’s faith in the information they receive, RT promotes the idea that there are always at least two sides to every story and by providing another side to the story that fits their interests, RT is able (at least in some instances) to turn the tide of criticism and critique in the direction in likes.

Once the authority of the media has been undermined, as the authority of the scientist was undermined in the variation of the Milgram experiment discussed above, opinions can no longer be formed on the basis of truth or falsity but have to be based on the weighing up of different perspectives. But unless you’re an expert, you have no basis from which to criticize. If I find I can’t trust the BBC, for instance, what can possibly justify accepting its version of the events in Ukraine over Russia’s? Perhaps there is another story; perhaps we can’t escape past our perspective.

In the Europe Russia wants to create, the Putin regime presented on the BBC— authoritarian, and built on corruption, control, and violence—simply hasn’t had had a fair chance to speak for itself, and perhaps the BBCs narrative is simply insensitive to the intricacies of a culture Europeans couldn’t possibly understand. All of these doubts breed an introspection that takes the focus off of Russia, and puts it onto one’s own assumptions, prejudices and preconceptions, creating a sort of moral paralysis [stalemate – edited – DH] perfectly suited to Russia’s multipolar aspirations, mirroring trends already present in domestic identity politics. If it succeeds at turning Europe’s gaze inwards it will have won the information war, neutralizing its opponents weapons at their source, and securing for Russia an ideological safe zone free of foreign interference.