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The aff’s skepticism at the micropolitical level works hand-in-hand with Russian efforts to disarm the American public towards Russia and sabotage US efforts to counter it

P. B. Craik, 19 – London School of Economics and Political Science “The Weaponization of Postmodernism: Russia’s New War with Europe” https://aei.pitt.edu/102413/1/LEQSPaper146.pdf

The promotion of scepticism in this way is absolutely central not just to understanding RT but to understanding Russia’s IW programme in general. This can be seen in the campaign to influence the 2016 presidential election in the United States, which made use of a wide variety of IW tools, including not just traditional media but also social media and cyber weapons, and which had the same effect. Here too, excessive focus on any apparent tactical aims can easily obscure the true strategic importance of such attacks. As Nocetti writes, ‘Russian maneuvers aimed less at influencing the outcome of the election than at the perceptions (soznanie) Americans have about the reliability of their rulers and institutions… Moscow’s larger goal is to strengthen the doubt in public opinion toward Western policies and values: liberal democracy, multiculturalism, and interventionism under the guise of “responsibility to protect”’ (Nocetti 2018: p. 193). If those in the United States who imagined a decisive role for Russian interference in the victory of Donald Trump were wrong to draw on such an exaggerated picture Russian of capabilities, they were also mistaken in their assessment of the fundamental aims of that interference. That doubt in the legitimacy of the current president, the American media system, and so on, has been generated on such a large scale — that was the aim of Russian efforts. In this they were remarkably successful. The victory of a candidate much more favorable to their interests was, as it were, the cherry on top — if a rather large one.

To reiterate, the promotion of epistemic insecurity among the populations of Russia’s enemies constitutes the first part of the applied postmodernism tactic. This function benefits the Putin regime in at least two ways, one tactical and one strategic. In the short term, the spread of confusion allows the regime to diminish or counter negative coverage of its actions. In the long term, however, it works to undermine the perceived objectivity of Western positions and values, turning them into just one among a number of self-interested positions in a swarm of competing narratives. This serves to undermine the perceived legitimacy of Western criticisms of Russia, neutralising what it fears most, the spread of Western values and practices and a colour style revolution at home.

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