Deterrence works – Russia historically only respects military force, and rejects compromise

Recognition that confrontation with Russia cannot be avoided because it is already happening, and acceptance that resolving this conflict will be a long, costly and potentially painful process, will underpin and augment the effect of any deterrent measures put in place. Understanding and accepting this basic clash of interests and world views inevitably means that alongside the concurrent challenge from China, the West must continue to invest heavily and for the long term in deterring Russia from aggressive and hostile actions. This deterrence must include willingness to impose costs and consequences on Russia in response to military adventurism, cyber and information assaults, or any of the other ways in which Russia endangers the integrity of Western states or the lives and livelihoods of their citizens. The process will inevitably be costly and damaging for both sides – but it has to be remembered that a failure to deter Moscow invites consequences that are far more costly and far more damaging.

It is axiomatic, and has been demonstrated repeatedly over history, that Russia respects strength and despises compromise and accommodation. This strength must necessarily include military power, present and ready for use, to provide a visible counter to Russia’s own new capabilities. Some European nations continue to act on the belief that maintaining strong standing armies and investing in hardware and manpower is an outmoded metric of national security. But Russia’s traditional and persistent respect for brute military force as the key determinant of national status and the right to assert national interests means that Western states must respond in kind, because the maintenance of at least comparable conventional military capability is essential to ensuring that Russia does not perceive opportunities to further its interests – or to remove notional threats to itself – by military means.

Deterrence cannot stop Russia from wishing to damage the US and the West more broadly, and finding ways to do so where it thinks actions will remain either undetected or unpunished. This desire is based on attitude, convictions and world view, rather than on temporary or reactive policy. The best remaining option is to deter Moscow from intervention against members of NATO or the EU by causing it to believe that the costs will be too high because other members of the organizations will respond appropriately, as opposed to seeking a diplomatic solution or a back-door deal to evade their responsibilities and treaty obligations. This requires continuing demonstrations both of resolve and of global military capability that outweighs Russia’s and can be brought to bear swiftly to inflict deterrence by punishment if deterrence by denial has failed. Critically, overall military superiority matters to Russia, as opposed solely to those assets and capabilities present in Europe. What Russia fears most is large-scale and protracted war with the US or with NATO as a whole, where all of this military power can be brought to bear, since the result of such a conflict is in no doubt. It follows that any measure by the US that gives rise to any doubt as to its military superiority – or as to the will to employ it – is highly damaging for its own national security and that of its allies.

A further consequence of Russia’s historical consistency is that it is a profound mistake to identify the current confrontation with President Putin as an individual. According to Matt Rojansky of the Kennan Institute, ‘Putin is a reflection of Russia … This weird notion that Putin will go away and there will suddenly be a pliant Russia is false.’186 Indeed, ‘Putin is not the reckless, unorthodox, swaggering Kremlin chief usually depicted in the West, but rather one operating in the mainstream of Russian policy for the last 100 years and more.’187 The direct implication is that any strategy that will successfully deter Russia cannot be a short-term one. It must instead be designed to be sustainable over the long term.

For the nearer future, it should be recalled that events in Ukraine and Syria have emboldened Russia and once again demonstrated to Moscow the utility of military force for achieving strategic aims. The US and its allies need to have policies and plans in place for responding to the next use of that force.