Doesn’t matter – advanced tech means even if spending is higher, the offensive benefits gained from leading in tech outweighs.

This element is particularly important to emerging powers since the offensive capabilities can be used in arms forces. The use of AI, robotics, directed energy, cyber warfare, and orbital systems secure competitive advantages and strengthen deterrence by curbing lower level challenges and achieving strategic advantage. China has developed several systems that could penetrate US defenses. According to some accounts, "China has likely surpassed the US in the development of a new class of weapons, hypersonic strike vehicles, and may be within months of deploying such systems" (Lewis 2019, p. 6). In addition, the focus is not on military expenditure or the number of military equipment but on the ability to significantly disrupt, degrade, and dismantle military infrastructure.

One could reasonably argue that China’s development and enhancement of offensive capabilities position it as a potential threat, even though its defense budget does not align with that of the US.Footnote22 Nevertheless, Xi Jinping has pushed, as indicated in the “Military Strategic Directive for a New Era”,Footnote23 for intensifying innovation in ETs to “build a strong military” and reach greater strategic autonomy, while the 14th 5-year plan (2021–25)Footnote24 describes a goal of developing disruptive technologies that would give China a military advantage over rivals and close the gap with the US (Duchâtel 2023).

Concerns related to Chinese technology development have reached an apex when it comes to China’s civil–military fusion (CMF) strategy, with US decision-makers constantly referring to the CMF strategy as a malign agenda and a global security threat (Manuel and Hicks 2020). For example, in 2019, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (US department of State, para. 1) stated: “I have been sounding alarm bells to the United States’ partners and allies, U.S. corporations, and to the American public about Beijing’s strategy of ‘Military-Civil Fusion’, or MCF [(…)] one of the United States’ most pressing national security threats.”

At the same time, China’s access to European dual-use technology has raised concerns not just for Europe’s bilateral relations with China, but also for the management of Europe’s relationship with the United States (Duchâtel 2023).

The European Commission’s outlining the “European Economic Security Strategy” has emphasized the need “to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies, as well as other dual-use items, to destinations of concern that operate civil–military fusion strategies” (European Commission 2023). The reason for mounting concerns stems from the blurred nature of China’s CMF strategy, which in fact builds upon decades of civil–military integration efforts of previous Chinese leaders (Kania and Laskai 2021). For other states, China’s CMF enhances its military capabilities, which could suddenly disrupt the global military balance.

AI also augments cyber capabilities to develop AI-enhanced cyber weapons (or “adversarial AI”) which may appear relatively benign, for example, enumerating the target space or repackaging malware to avoid detection and can have significant destabilizing effects in the target countries (Johnson and Krabill 2020). Another area of concern has been China enhancing its military capability by employing “intelligentized warfare” doctrine with the help of AI and ramping up its collaboration with major tech companies such as Hikvision and iFlytek that create two-way around innovation ecosystems (Kania 2017). Moreover, some scholars posit that China may employ ET, particularly AI, in psychological warfare operations to gain decision-making advantages and to anticipate the decisions of enemy forces in the gray zone. Given, also, the Chinese military’s growing emphasis on data—that is, the current informatization (information-driven) and future intelligentization (artificial intelligence-driven) views of warfare—one can conclude that the ability to manipulate information, broadly defined as information warfare (信息战),Footnote25 including the ability to manipulate how adversaries receive and process that information (psychological warfare) has become one of China’s foremost priorities (Beacuchamp-Mustafaga 2023).

Lastly, regarding the prospective development of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), despite having repeatedly supported a legal ban on LAWS, China has been promoting a narrow understanding of these systems that intends to exclude such systems from what it deems “beneficial” uses of AI (Qiao-Franco and Bode 2023). In addition, the fact that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is using MCF to “weaponize biotech” using CRISPR gene-editing technology, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and biomimetic materials and human performance enhancement (Kania and VornDick 2019) indicates the offensive nature of the country’s capabilities. Considering the potentially transformative impacts of ETs across various military strategic domains, and recognizing the role of AI as a force multiplier, it becomes apparent that if an adversary's AI systems lack attributes such as transparency, reliability, and verifiability, it becomes challenging to accurately gauge the adversary's capabilities (Johnson 2020). Thus, it becomes harder to objectively assess their deterrent threat credibility, while concerns grow about how these technologies can bolster a state’s offensive capabilities and heighten other states’ threat perceptions.