Newest tech and Chinese global reach means geography doesn’t check.

Geography and distance are key factors in determining plans and strategy, as well as broader security and diplomatic policies of states (Heginbotham et al. 2015). Furthermore, the BoT theory suggests that rising powers like China, geographical proximity “will inevitably induce fear and apprehension among surrounding smaller states” (Chu et al. 2015, p. 406).

Nonetheless, the concept becomes obsolete in the face of the ETs that transcend borders, with threat perceptions no longer confined to surrounding or neighboring states. China’s pursuit of global digital leadership in multiple areas, such as digital infrastructure, e-commerce, and research collaboration (Shi-Kupfer and Ohlberg 2019), has been evident in the development of a global Chinese technology network through state-backed companies. Chinese companies supply AI surveillance technology to 63 countries that use exclusively Chinese technology, most of which are in Africa and Latin America (Feldsten 2019). At the same time, state-backed companies such as Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent have already established their presence in numerous states' telecommunications networks, data centers, and online payment systems. Through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road (DSR), these companies, including Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, NucTech, and others, are exporting AI technologies, providing support, and directly participating in the deployment and development of various technologies such as cloud computing, smart cities, digital payment systems, and AI within host countries (Greene and Triolo 2020; Feldstein 2019). As this intricate web of digital market interconnections continues to expand, it presents a substantial challenge to other powers irrespective of their geographical locations (Shi-Kupfer and Ohlberg 2019). As such, Beijing’s investments in several countries allow China to leverage its global technology power image (Fannin 2020).

For the BoT and the realist paradigm in general, the competition of states for territory, resources and access to important geographical positions is imperative for the power distribution in the international system; as such, the geographic expansion of Chinese manufacturers and suppliers could lead to a significant advantage over other competitors, particularly given Beijing’s principle of non-interference in a country's internal affairs when doing business (Papageorgiou 2023). The acquisition of Western firms by Chinese multinationals has increased dramatically in recent years following the Going Global Strategy. Chinese MNEs have used outwards foreign direct investments (OFDI) to acquire brands, advanced technologies, sophisticated management, and marketing skills in developed countries through aggressive strategic asset-seeking M&As (Anderson et al. 2015). For instance, two Chinese companies affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army bought three Swedish semiconductor startups in 2018 and bought off British chipmaker “Imagination” and German robot-maker "Kuka” (Braw 2020). These cross-border mergers and acquisitions have raised national security concerns for governments (Williamson and Raman 2011) and have been described as a threat to a hosts’ national security (Yang and Deng 2017; Li et al. 2017).

In the semiconductor industry in particular, with its unbalanced global value chain geography privileging a few states, China sought to increase geopolitical space amid the technological race with the US, especially since the latter seeks to return the global center of gravity for integrated circuits (IC) from East Asia back to the US through the “reshoring” of several key industries (Yeung 2022; Triolo 2023).Footnote20

In addition, ETs such as AI are key to the control of geographic space and the five dimensions (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) of warfare and their interoperability (Fricke 2020). The US and its allies have long benefited from the geography of the internet and its global reach with the most valuable American tech companies gaining the bulk of their revenue outside the United States (Imbrie et at. 2020). Nevertheless, China is on track to possess as much as 30 percent of the world’s data by 2030Footnote21 while its Datasphere is expected to be the largest of all regions by 2025 (compared to EMEA, APJxC, U.S.) which will allow it to deploy video surveillance in different parts of the world (Rydning et al. 2018). In addition, given that AI systems know no geographical constraints and are not confined to one geographic region (Lorenzo et al. 2021), “AI-powered intelligence systems may provide the ability to integrate and sort through large troves of data from different sources and geographic locations to identify patterns and highlight useful information, significantly improving intelligence analysis” (Allen and Chan 2017, p. 47), thus expanding the country’s global reach but also raising threat perceptions, given that the threat is not only transboundary but can be initiated from anywhere, mitigating the importance of the geographic dimension.