‘Should’ could be uncertain.

3 The verb “should” has various shades of meaning. In its ordinary meaning it does not express certainty as the word “will” sometimes does. In the telegram under consideration it seems to be used in the sense that, from the anticipated profits, plaintiff might receive a bonus of $25 to $50 per month. It is nothing more than an expression of opinion, with no definite assurance that such would be the result. The expression, “twenty–five to fifty dollars per month extra,” adds nothing to the certainty or definiteness of the proposal but is merely suggestive. The whole expression, “a part of profits that should mean from twenty–five to fifty dollars per month extra, to our minds cannot possibly be construed as guaranty or an unconditional promise to pay a minimum of $25 per month or a maximum of $50 per month out of the profits, in addition to the agreed salary. It is merely suggestive. Moreover, no method is provided for determining what the share of plaintiff in the profits might be; no per cent. is named. Whether net or gross profits or whether profits from the whole store or only the furniture department, were to be the basis of settlement, is all left to conjecture. There is no stipulation as to when settlements were to be made, which, obviously, might be either weekly, monthly, annually, or whenever the employment should cease. The expression in the telegram, “if you want to come and work hard, we will take care of you in good shape,” avails plaintiff nothing from the standpoint of law. The whole telegram is one well calculated to mislead, whether deliberate or not. Morally, defendant was under some obligation to increase plaintiff's salary in the event the concern prospered and plaintiff worked hard; but, legally, we are confronted with an insurmountable obstacle in so far as affording relief to plaintiff is concerned. It is an elemental and fundamental rule of law that a contract, to be valid, “must be certain and unequivocal in its essential terms, either within itself or by reference to some other agreement or matter.” 6 R. C. L. 644; 9 Cyc. 245; 18 R. C. L. 494; Burks v. Stam, 65 Mo. App. 455; Blaine v. Knapp & Co., 140 Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787; United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527, 53 L. R. A. 288; Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, 111 N. E. 822, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 758.