Democracy is unstable

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, some researchers assumed that the global spread of democracy would end the era of revolutions (; ; , , ; ; ; ). According to Sanderson, who in turn draws on the work of Goodwin (, ), “revolutions [are] unlikely in years ahead primarily because of the wave of democratization that has swept over much of the less-developed world in the past two decades… Why should democratization reduce the probability of revolution? For one thing, it ameliorates (even if it does not eliminate) social conflict, and it institutionalizes that conflict by redirecting it into socially legitimate channels. If people are unhappy with their rulers, they recognize that they have an opportunity to get rid of them in the next election. Democratic regimes of government also provide people with the opportunity to engage in popular protests that often allow them to win concessions from economic and political elites. Goodwin’s conclusion is that “the ballot box has been the coffin of revolutionaries” (2003, p. 67). Indeed, the evidence gives strong support to this view. As Goodwin notes, no revolution has ever overthrown a democratic regime” (, p. 201).

However, as almost two decades have passed after Goodwin’s papers, the world has seen several democratically elected rulers overthrown by revolutions. The most notable example is the Ukrainian Revolution of 2013–2014, which toppled the democratically elected President Viktor Yanukovych well before the end of his presidential term. The revolution of June 30, 2013 in Egypt, which overthrew (with the assistance of the Egyptian military) the democratically elected Mohamed Morsi is another notable case. The revolution in Armenia in 2018 can also be considered here as a solid example (; , ; ). What is the explanation behind this discrepancy between theory and observation?