Federal intellectual property rights are Congressional, not judicial.
Jim Chen 5. [Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. “The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy” Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 81, issue 1. 11-1-2005. https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1325&context=ndlr]//dawn
To be sure, substantive canons of statutory interpretation do have their drawbacks. Especially when they draw upon the Constitution as a source of inspiration or authority, substantive canons represent a form of stealth constitutional law.8 5 Aggressive interpretation of intellectual property statutes may open a back door to the very sort of active intervention that courts routinely forswear when they are asked to pass on the constitutionality of these enactments. After all, the very existence of federal intellectual property rights means that Congress has seen fit to grant some measure of "exclusive Rights," and courts must respect the exercise of legitimate legislative prerogative. Even the substantive canon prescribing narrow construction of public grants by the government to private parties,8 6 the traditional canon that most closely resembles the intellectual property canon I am proposing, is not an inexorable command to foreclose private access to public lands and other government-owned resources. Public grants can sometimes be liberally interpreted when private benefits have been given in order to expedite some sort of great public purpose, such as the construction of the transcontinental railroad.8 7 Similarly, the intellectual property canon should not uniformly constrict proprietary grants or facilitate the reckless award or extension of rights in intangible property,8s but rather should be flexible enough to counsel either the enhancement or reduction of proprietary protection, as the societal interest in the creation and dissemination of inventions warrants.