Psychology—Racial bias is malleable and can be changed

Evidence that Implicit Biases Are Malleable¶ Scientists have developed a body of empirical evidence that implicit biases are malleable over the past quarter century. The empirical record is now well established and offers strong evidence that implicit attitudes are neither inaccessible nor inescapable; they are not impossible to control; they are not out of reach. In fact, implicit associations can be influenced both by the individual who unconsciously holds these stereotypes and prejudices and by external factors. Researchers have reported and reviewed numerous studies that put two important misconceptions about implicit biases to rest. First, the evidence demonstrates that unconscious implicit attitudes are responsive to the deliberate choices and influences of an individual even though that person is not consciously experiencing the bias. Second, implicit biases are not impervious to relatively short-term change even though they arise from social knowledge that was acquired slowly, and over a lifetime. In fact, the evidence reveals that learning can continue to take place and alter social group knowledge, after initial attitudes and associations are formed. Take, for example, a person who developed bad driving habits over time and subconsciously incorporated those habits into driving behavior for many years. If this person chooses to be mindful of improving his or her driving, either out of a conscious decision to do so or in response to external influences, those bad habits can be altered. External authorities may incentivize improvement through a media campaign, new rules of the road, prosecution for reckless driving, or a driver's education class. Thus, malleability describes an ongoing learning process in which people with old, objectionable implicit biases learn to respond to newer, more appropriate attitudes and beliefs. Put another way, longstanding and unconscious thinking can change.¶ This understanding of malleability is called the “connectionist" model of implicit bias. Unlike the prior notion that implicit associations are static and inaccessibly fixed, the empirical record reveals that stereotypes and prejudicial beliefs to which we may adhere at any given time are “states” of thinking that form based on past experiences and current inputs. Biases can be revised depending upon current informational inputs gathered and weighed with each new encounter. This flexible view of stereotyping replaces an outdated rigid one and allows for the evidence that individuals can constantly update the stored group knowledge that produces implicit biases. The connectionist model ex. plains that a stereotype is merely a pattern of activation that, at a given point in time, is jointly determined by current input (i.e., the context) and the weight of the new information’s connection to existing and underlying beliefs. Psychologists now conclude that “stereotypes are quite elastic and thus any individual could hold and even change an infinite number of representations of social category's members, when viewed across time and place?”¶ The connectionist model contrasts with early theories of implicit bias, which focused on their automaticity. ‘Automaticity' refers generally to the way that individuals make associations without any awareness, without intentionality, and without responsibility for the influence the associations have in directing their conduct and choices.“ Early researchers concluded that automaticity meant inevitability. For example, one researcher said, “a crucial component of automatic pro~ ceases is their inescapability; they occur despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore them.”7 This view is no longer correct. Over the past twenty years. researchers have collected a strong record to contradict this notion that implicit attitudes change slowly, if at all, simply because they develop slowly over time. This idea has been replaced by what Dr. Irene Blair has called “the now-bountiful evidence that automatic attitudes and self-reported attitudes-~are sensitive to personal, social, and situational pressures." Blair points out that “the conclusion that automatic stereotypes and prejudice are not as inflexible as previously assumed is strengthened by the number and variety of demonstrations. . . . The fact that the tests were conducted in the service of many different goals, and by the similarity of findings across different measmres."9¶ The importance of understanding that implicit biases are malleable cannot be overstated. First, malleability means that interventions may be strategically introduced to provide current inputs that alter implicit biases. Thus, we can expect that implicit biases can be reduced. To say that biased attitudes may be “reduced” is to say that current informational inputs can be adjusted so that the resulting stereotype patterns to longer conform to traditional, discriminatory, or inequitable stereotypes, but instead lead individuals and institutions to more equitable judgments and more equitable conduct. Furthermore, malleability also leans that the discriminatory impacts that result from implicit biases so maybe reduced. The research that gave rise to the connectionist mode has provided important insights concerning the several methods available to individuals and institutions wishing to ameliorate the discriminatory impact of decisions and conduct informed by imme biases, stereotyping, and prejudice. Finally, by demonstrating that even subconscious racial biases are within reach and control, researchers have provided a sound basis for holding individuals and institutions responsible for reducing implicit racial and ethnic biases and for reducing the discriminatory harms caused by unconscious racism.