IP attracts rent-seeking too and all systems have costs
Kapczynski ’12 --- Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School (2012, Amy Kapczynski, “The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism,” https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/59-4-3.pdf, DB)
The main drawback with such models is likely the expense of administration, which increases with prize complexity.63 But IP, prizes, and government contracts all have costs of implementation, so the matter is really one of comparative cost. Commentators have also emphasized the potential problem of capture when innovation is induced through prizes and contracts.64 But insofar as IP systems generate rents, they also attract rent seeking—as they clearly have in recent years.65 Commentators have additionally worried that prizes carry a risk that the government may renege on its promise to pay after costs have been sunk.66 This problem is minimized with contracts because contracts pay up front. But IP mechanisms may have their own problems of uncertainty because, for example, the value of investments may be subject to stochastic, black-swan events.67 IP systems, like prize systems, are also subject to ex post changes that can diminish the benefits that were expected ex ante, such as compulsory licensing schemes or even simple shifts to doctrinal rules about the scope of protection or remedies.