A.I. cannot enable certain counterforce yet, but it could in the future.

It is widely expected that artificial intelligence (AI) will disrupt and fundamentally transform many aspects of social, economic, and political life over the coming decades.2 As we are in the early stages of AI adoption in most fields, many discussions of its potential necessarily impact remain vague and superficial, including where national security is concerned. 3 Nevertheless, some scholars have productively explored AI’s impact on the character of warfare,4 the balance of power among states,5 and human society itself. 6 This article contributes to this growing body of literature by examining how this new technology might interact with one of the most prominent features of the post-World War II strategic environment: nuclear weapons. Specifically, it asks whether AI driven improvements to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, i.e., automated image recognition/computer vision, could enable an effective counterforce capability and thereby imperil nuclear deterrence and weaken first-strike stability. 7 Since the advent of the nuclear age, analysts have been divided over the meaning of nuclear weapons for international politics. Proponents of the “nuclear revolution” argue that nuclear weapons, particularly a secure second-strike capability, which would allow a state to retaliate with nuclear force after suffering a first strike, satisfy a state’s security needs because they present a potential for unacceptable damage that would deter any potential challenger from even considering aggression.8 In their view, international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons would be largely peaceful, competition would be relegated to the margins, and nuclear superiority would be meaningless.9 However, recent research suggests that this may not be the case. In fact, nuclear weapon states have sought to hold at risk the nuclear arsenals of their adversaries throughout the nuclear age.10 Still, no country has attacked another’s operational nuclear arsenal.11 That is because the requirements for a disarming strike are considerably higher than for damage limitation or retaliation against nuclear attack. A state trying to disarm its opponent would have to be certain to destroy, or at least disable, all of its adversary’s nuclear weapons. Even one operational nuclear warhead could inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory blow. The inability to be certain that a first strike could find and eliminate all enemy nuclear weapons has been the main roadblock for effective counterforce.12 As the number of battlefield sensors grows and ISR capabilities improve, however, this roadblock is crumbling. Some expect it to be fully overcome with the help of AI.