Chinese authoritarianism paradoxically constrains development.
Sheehan 23 (Matt Sheehan is a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where his research covers global technology issues with a focus on China.) “China’s AI Regulations and How They Get Made” July 10, 2023 https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/07/chinas-ai-regulations-and-how-they-get-made?lang=en // ZX
Countries and cultures may differ on the specific content of AI regulations, but they can learn from the content-agnostic structure of the regulations themselves. The above Chinese regulations share three structural similarities: the choice of algorithms as a point of entry; the building of regulatory tools and bureaucratic know-how; and the vertical and iterative approach that is laying the groundwork for a capstone AI law.
Algorithms as Point of Entry
AI governance can utilize different parts of the AI supply chain as a point of entry. Measures can focus on regulating training data, algorithms, or computing power, or they can simply impose requirements on the final actions taken by an AI product, leaving the remedies up to the developer. China’s approach to AI governance has been uniquely focused on algorithms.
This choice is clearly displayed in Chinese policy discourse around regulations and the decision to make algorithms the fundamental unit for transparency and disclosure via the algorithm registry. Some companies have been forced to complete over five separate filings for the same app, each covering a different algorithm used for personalized recommendation, content filtering, and more. The structure of the registry and the required disclosures reveal a belief that effective regulation entails an understanding of, and potentially an intervention into, individual algorithms.
China’s regulations are not exclusively focused on algorithms. The registry includes requirements to disclose the sources of training data, and the draft generative AI regulation has specific requirements on the data’s diversity and “objectivity.” Many other requirements, such as that AI-generated content “reflect Socialist Core Values,” are defined based on outcomes rather than technical specifics. Where regulators focus their interventions will be an important component of Chinese AI governance going forward.
Building Regulatory Tools and Bureaucratic Know-How
China’s initial forays into governing AI have built up specific regulatory tools and broader bureaucratic know-how that can be deployed in future regulations. The algorithm registry is a standardized disclosure tool that ministries can easily include in future regulations, refining its requirements as needed. The information currently disclosed—such as data sources and security self-assessments, among others—may or may not prove to be useful to regulators. But the tool itself can act as a kind of regulatory scaffolding that eases the construction of future measures governing the technology.
Likewise, Chinese regulators are building up know-how about the technology and potential interventions. When representatives from the CAC first met with AI companies to discuss their algorithm submissions, they reportedly “displayed little understanding of the technical details,” forcing company representatives to “rely on a mix of metaphors and simplified language.” Such meetings are an awkward but likely necessary step as bureaucrats attempt to grapple with a complex new technology. They help the regulators to build relationships to key players, to learn what they do not know, and to either upskill or hire to fill those gaps.
Vertical and Iterative—For Now
Stepping further back to the scope of each regulation, China has taken a regulatory approach that is both vertical and iterative. Vertical regulations target a specific application or manifestation of a technology. This contrasts with horizontal regulations, such as the European Union’s AI Act, that are comprehensive umbrella laws attempting to cover all applications of a given technology. No regulation is perfectly horizontal or vertical, but most regulations lean in one direction or the other.
China’s first batch of algorithm and AI regulations are relatively vertical. Each covers a basket of related applications that Chinese regulators are concerned about and imposes requirements specific to these concerns. The baskets of applications are relatively large; for example, the recommendation algorithm regulation covers things from social media feeds to algorithms that set expected wait times for food delivery.
In addition to being vertical, the regulations are iterative. If the government deems a regulation it has issued to be flawed or insufficient, it will simply release a new one that plugs holes or expands the scope, as it did with the generative AI draft regulation expanding on the deep synthesis measures. This iterative process can lead to confusion for companies doing compliance, but Chinese regulators view that as an acceptable cost in regulating a fast-changing technology environment.
The vertical and iterative approach of the past few years now appears to be building toward something more ambitious. In June 2023, China’s State Council—the rough equivalent of the U.S. Cabinet—announced that this year it would begin preparations on a draft Artificial Intelligence Law (人工智能法) to be submitted to the National People’s Congress, China’s legislature. Details remain sparse, but Chinese scholars anticipate that the law will build on the existing regulations to create a more comprehensive, horizontal piece of legislation that acts as a capstone on Chinese AI policy.
The Core Motivations Driving Chinese AI Governance
At a high level, China’s existing AI regulations are motivated by three main goals and one auxiliary goal.
The first, overriding goal is to shape the technology so that it serves the CCP’s agenda, particularly for information control and, flowing from this, political and social stability. The primacy of control over information shows up clearly in the choice to first tackle AI and algorithms’ influence on online content. From the CCP’s perspective, for a technology to be productive it first must be tamed. As Chinese AI governance matures, this focus will likely evolve to include more industrial or security-related applications of the technology.
The second major goal behind Chinese AI governance is both obvious and frequently overlooked: to address the myriad social, ethical, and economic impacts AI is having on people in China. The CCP prizes political control over nearly all else, but the Chinese academics, policy analysts, journalists, and technocrats who are shaping the regulations are much like their counterparts abroad—they are genuinely grappling with the diverse ways in which AI will change the lives of Chinese people. One example is in the regulatory provisions protecting workers whose schedules and salaries are set by algorithms. Chinese policy actors operate in a far more politically constrained environment than their peers in liberal democracies, with certain topics taboo and many policy prescriptions off the table. But even within those constraints, there is still substantial room to explore the challenges of AI and to experiment with regulatory interventions to mitigate them.